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REFLECTIONS ON ANIMALS, PROPERTY,
AND THE LAW AND RAIN WITHOUT
THUNDER
GARY L. FRANCIONE*
I
INTRODUCTION
In my 1995 book, Animals, Property, and the Law, I argue that animalwelfare laws do not provide any significant protection to nonhuman animals
1
because nonhumans are the property of humans. Animals are things that we
own and that have only extrinsic or conditional value as means to our ends. We
may as a matter of personal choice attach a higher value to our companion
animals, such as dogs and cats, but as far as the law is concerned, even these
animals are nothing more than commodities. As a general matter, we do not
regard animals as having any intrinsic value and we protect animal interests
only to the extent that it benefits us to do so.
We claim to take animal interests seriously from both a moral and legal
perspective, which is why we have anticruelty and other animal-welfare laws in
the first place. We purport to balance human and animal interests, but because
animals are property, there can be no meaningful balance. Animal interests will
almost always be regarded as less important than human interests, even when
the human interest at stake is relatively trivial and the animal interest at stake is
significant. The result of any supposed balancing of human and nonhuman
interests required by animal-welfare laws is predetermined from the outset by
the property status of the nonhuman as a “food animal,” “experimental
animal,” “game animal,” et cetera.
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1. GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW (1995). Throughout this article, I
use “nonhuman” and “animal” interchangeably, but it should not be forgotten that humans are animals
as well. In addition, I use “animal who” rather than “animal that” to emphasize that nonhumans are not
objects, as implied by our reference to them as “it.”
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Although we supposedly prohibit the infliction on animals of “unnecessary”
suffering, we do not ask whether particular animal uses are necessary even
though most of the suffering that we impose on animals cannot be characterized
as necessary in any meaningful sense.2 Rather, we ask only whether particular
treatment is necessary given uses that are per se not necessary. We look to the
customs and practices of the various institutions of exploitation and we assume
that those involved in the activity would not inflict more pain and suffering than
required for the particular purpose because it would be irrational to do so, just
as it would be for the owner of a car to dent her vehicle for no reason.
For example, although it is not necessary for humans to eat meat or dairy
products and these foods may well be detrimental to human health and the
environment, we do not ask about the necessity per se of using animals for food.
We ask only whether the pain and suffering imposed on animals used for food
go beyond what is regarded as acceptable according to the customs and
practices of animal agriculture. To the extent it is customary for farmers to
castrate or brand farm animals, both very painful activities, we regard such
actions as “necessary” because we assume that farmers would not mutilate
animals for no reason.
The result of this framework is that the level of care required by animalwelfare laws rarely rises above that which a rational property owner would
provide in order to exploit the animal in an economically efficient way. Because
animals are property, we consider as “humane” treatment that we would regard
as torture if it were inflicted on humans.
In my 1996 book, Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights
Movement,3 I argue that there are important theoretical and practical
differences between the animal-rights- and animal-welfare positions and that
welfarist regulation intended to make animal treatment more “humane” will,
for the most part, do nothing but make animal exploitation more efficient.
Welfarist regulation, I maintain, does not recognize or protect the inherent
value of animals and will not lead in some incremental way to the abolition of

2. For a discussion of the necessity of animal use, see GARY L. FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION TO
ANIMAL RIGHTS: YOUR CHILD OR THE DOG? 1–49 (2000). Courts have explicitly recognized that
prohibitions against “unnecessary” suffering or “needless” killing must be interpreted by reference to
institutional uses that are per se not necessary:
The flesh of animals is not necessary for the subsistence of man, at least in this country, and by
some people it is not so used. Yet it would not be denied that the killing of oxen for food is
lawful. Fish are not necessary to any one, nor are various wild animals which are killed, and
sold in market; yet their capture and killing are regulated by law. The words “needlessly” and
“unnecessarily” must have a reasonable, not an absolute and literal, meaning attached to
them.
State v. Bogardus, 4 Mo. App. 215, 216–17 (1877). Courts have also recognized that practices that are
regarded as “cruel” as we normally use that term in ordinary discourse are permitted within the
meaning of anticruelty laws. See FRANCIONE, supra note 1, at 146; FRANCIONE, supra note 2, at 58–63;
see also infra notes 174–78 and accompanying text (discussing anticruelty laws).
3. See GARY L. FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ANIMAL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1996).
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animal exploitation. For example, the federal Humane Slaughter Act,4 which
supposedly requires the “humane” slaughter of nonhumans for food purposes,
prohibits suffering only to the extent that it ensures worker safety, reduces
carcass damage, and provides other economic benefits for humans.5 It would,
however, be an absurd use of the word to characterize any slaughterhouse as
“humane.”
To the extent that animal advocates seek protection for animals that
exceeds what is necessary to exploit them for a particular purpose, the property
status of nonhumans and the political compromise that is required invariably
result in regulations that do little—if anything—to affect adversely the interests
of human property owners or to improve the treatment of nonhumans. The
primary effect of these measures is to make the public feel better about animal
exploitation, which actually may result in a net increase of animal suffering
through increased use. A central thesis of Rain Without Thunder, as well as my
6
later work, is that, if animal interests are to be morally significant, we must
accord to nonhumans the basic right not to be treated as property, and this
requires that we seek to abolish, and not merely to regulate, institutionalized
animal exploitation.
A number of my critics have argued that, although we do treat animals
badly, there is nothing inherent in the property status of animals that would
prevent us from changing the law to require that animals be accorded better
treatment and so animal advocates ought to pursue incremental improvements
in animal welfare.7 Although I maintain that we cannot justify the property

4. Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-765, 72 Stat. 862, (codified at 7
U.S.C. §§ 1901–1907 (2000)). Usually referred to as the “Humane Slaughter Act,” the Act originally
applied to animals slaughtered for sale to the federal government, but was reauthorized in 1978 and
covers animals slaughtered in federally inspected plants. For a discussion of the considerations that
motivated the Humane Slaughter Act, see FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 95–102. See also infra notes
107–09 and accompanying text (discussing failure to enforce the Humane Slaughter Act).
5. See FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 95–102. The “[f]indings and declarations of policy” of the
Humane Slaughter Act make clear the importance of economic considerations in assessing matters of
animal welfare:
The Congress finds that the use of humane methods in the slaughter of livestock prevents
needless suffering; results in safer and better working conditions for persons engaged in the
slaughtering industry; brings about improvement of products and economies in slaughtering
operations; and produces other benefits for producers, processors, and consumers which tend
to expedite an orderly flow of livestock and livestock products in interstate and foreign
commerce.
7 U.S.C. § 1901 (2000).
6. See generally FRANCIONE, supra note 2; Gary L. Francione, Animals—Property or Persons?, in
ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 108 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C.
Nussbaum eds., 2004).
7. See, e.g., ROBERT GARNER, ANIMALS, POLITICS AND MORALITY (2d ed. 2004); MIKE
RADFORD, ANIMAL WELFARE LAW IN BRITAIN: REGULATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 102–04, 394–95
(2001); David Favre, Integrating Animal Interests into Our Legal System, 10 ANIMAL L. 87 (2004);
Robert Garner, Political Ideology and the Legal Status of Animals, 8 ANIMAL L. 77 (2002); Jerrold
Tannenbaum, Animals and the Law: Property, Cruelty, Rights, 62 SOC. RES. 539 (1995); Cass R.
Sunstein, Slaughterhouse Jive, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 29, 2001, at 40 (reviewing GARY L. FRANCIONE,
INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL RIGHTS: YOUR CHILD OR THE DOG? (2000)); Steven M. Wise, Thunder
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status of nonhumans irrespective of how “humanely” we may treat them—just
as we cannot justify human slavery even if it is “humane”—I certainly agree
that we could treat animals better than we do and stated so explicitly in
Animals, Property, and the Law.8 The status of nonhumans as property,
however, militates strongly against significant improvement in our treatment of
animals, and animal welfare will do little more than make animal exploitation
more economically efficient and socially acceptable.
There can be no doubt that the animal-protection community in the United
States—and, indeed, throughout the world—has in the years since I wrote these
books achieved a greater degree of economic power and social prominence than
at any point in history. Therefore, if my critics are correct, and the property
status of nonhumans is not as significant an obstacle as I have claimed, it would
seem that there should be some evidence of progress that does not fit the model
that I have described. That is, there should be evidence of animal protection
that goes beyond what is required for efficient exploitation, reflecting at least a
nascent recognition of the inherent value of animals as opposed to their
exclusively extrinsic value as property. Instead, the events of the past decade or
so reinforce the view that the property status of nonhumans is a greater obstacle
than my critics and the animal-protection movement have recognized or
appreciated.
Part II of this article examines whether animal welfare in the United States
has moved us closer to recognizing the inherent value of nonhumans and
concludes that it has not. This is not a complete survey of federal and state law
or of changes that have occurred through the voluntary action of animal users;
rather, it focuses on those developments that animal advocates appear to regard
as most significant. Part III discusses some general reasons why the property
paradigm militates against better treatment of nonhumans. These remarks are
made primarily in the context of responding to criticisms of my views made by
Cass Sunstein.9 Part IV discusses the false dichotomy promoted by my critics
that we must either pursue traditional welfarist regulation or sacrifice
nonhumans to the “utopian” goal of abolition that will not be achieved for
many years, if ever. Part V offers some observations on the field of “animal
Without Rain: A Review/Commentary of Gary L. Francione’s Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of
the Animal Rights Movement, 3 ANIMAL L. 45 (1997).
8. In the Introduction to Animals, Property, and the Law, I state:
I do not maintain that characterizing sentient beings as property necessarily means that those
beings will be treated exactly the same as inanimate objects or that property can never have
rights as a matter of formal jurisprudential theory. For example, although slaves were, for
some purposes, considered “persons” who technically held certain rights, those rights were not
particularly effective in providing any real protection for slaves. We could decide to grant
certain rights to animals while continuing to regard them as property. The problem is that as
long as property is, as a matter of legal theory, regarded as that which cannot have interests or
cannot have interests that transcend the rights of property owners to use their property, then
there will probably always be a gap between what the law permits people to do with animals
and what any acceptable moral theory and basic decency tell us is appropriate.
FRANCIONE, supra note 1, at 14.
9. See Sunstein, supra note 7.
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law” as it has emerged in the past decade. Part VI addresses the view advanced
by some in the legal community that we ought to treat certain animals, such as
great apes, in a different manner based on their cognitive similarities to
humans.
II
THE FAILURE OF ANIMAL WELFARE
In the years since I first proposed the thesis about the property status of
animals, and despite claims by my critics that the property paradigm is
consistent with recognizing the inherent value of animal interests, there have
been no significant improvements in animal welfare or animal-welfare laws in
10
the United States, and almost all changes have been linked explicitly to
making animal use more efficient. That is, welfare changes are based on such
considerations as increasing productivity or reducing labor costs and do not
recognize that animals have inherent value requiring that we respect their
interests even when there is no benefit to us. These developments serve to
confirm my views about animals as property and of the generally ineffective and
often counterproductive nature of alleged advances in animal welfare. This part
discusses several examples of the “victories” proclaimed by animal advocates
during this time.

10. Peter Singer claims as one of the general “successes” of the animal-rights movement that the
numbers of animals used in experiments in Britain has fallen to less than half of what it was in 1970.
Peter Singer, Animal Liberation at 30, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 15, 2003, at 25. Singer does not mention,
however, that the number of animals used in Britain has increased in recent years. For example, in
2003, there were 2.8 million experiments involving animals in Britain, which was the largest number
since 1994 and followed an increase of four percent from the previous year. Moreover, there have been
significant increases in experiments involving physical trauma, psychological trauma, thermal injury,
and aversive training. See BRITISH UNION FOR THE ABOLITION OF VIVISECTION, UK ANIMAL
EXPERIMENTS STATISTICS 2003, available at http://www.buav.org/pdf/Stats2003.pdf (discussing report
by the Home Office of the United Kingdom).
Robert Garner states that “[i]n many European countries . . . factory farming is much nearer to
being phased out by state action” than it is in the United States. Garner, supra note 7, at 90. Garner’s
statement is certainly not accurate in that intensive agriculture is still very much the norm in Europe. In
any event, there cannot be any real doubt that nonhumans in Europe are, despite any differences, still
treated very badly. Moreover, there have been difficulties with domestic legislation to implement
certain E.U. animal-welfare measures and the effect of free-trade agreements and other globalization
efforts on domestic animal-welfare measures, many of which do not take effect until after 2010, remains
to be seen. As a general matter, whenever human interests are implicated, nonhuman interests are
ignored. For example, fear over the H5N1 virus, which is commonly called the “bird flu,” has resulted
in producers of free-range chickens returning to more intensive methods. See, e.g., Brian Brady and
Richard Gray, Jabs for Poultry Workers as Bird Flu Fears Grow, SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY, Feb. 26,
2006, at 11. Finally, European animal-welfare measures are often based on consideration of economic
efficiency and have nothing to do with recognizing the inherent value of nonhumans.
Another comparative example offered frequently involves the fact that some nations, such as
Britain, Sweden, and New Zealand, have laws or policies that afford more protection to great apes
based on their similarity to humans. For the most part, there had been very little use of great apes in
those countries, and restrictions were both easier to enact and less meaningful. Differential treatment
of great apes also serves to reinforce speciesist hierarchies rather than to erode them. See infra notes
181–86 and accompanying text (discussing “similar-minds” theory).
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A. Farm Animals and Industry Self-Regulation: A “[R]ay of [H]ope”?
11
Peter Singer, author of Animal Liberation and a defender of animalwelfare regulation, cites as an example of a “successful American campaign[]”
efforts by animal advocates and organizations, such as People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals (PETA), that led to agreement by McDonald’s to “set
and enforce higher standards for the slaughterhouses that supply it with meat”
and to provide increased space to hens confined in egg batteries.12 Singer claims
that these actions by McDonald’s, which were followed by Wendy’s and Burger
King, are a “ray of hope” and “the first hopeful signs for American farm
animals since the modern animal movement began.”13 PETA claims that
“‘[t]here’s been a real change in consciousness’”14 concerning the treatment of
animals used for food and praises McDonald’s as “‘leading the way’ in
reforming the practices of fast-food suppliers, in the treatment and killing of its
beef and poultry.”15
To the contrary, however, this supposed “change in consciousness” is, for
the most part, no different from the concerns for increasing the efficiency of
animal exploitation that motivated the passage in 1958 of the Humane
Slaughter Act and does not reflect any recognition that animals have interests
that should be protected even if there are no economic advantages to humans.16
The slaughterhouse standards praised by Singer and PETA were developed by
Temple Grandin, who designs “humane” slaughter and handling systems and
who is discussed at length in Rain Without Thunder.17 Grandin’s guidelines,
which involve techniques for moving animals through the slaughtering process
and stunning them, are based explicitly on economic concerns. According to
Grandin:

Once livestock—cattle, pigs and sheep—arrive at packing plants, proper handling
procedures are not only important for the animal’s well-being, they can also mean the

11. PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (2d ed. 1990).
12. Singer, supra note 10, at 26.
13. Id.
14. Stephanie Simon, Killing Them Softly; Voluntary Reforms in the Livestock Industry Have
Changed the Way Animals Are Slaughtered, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2003, at A1 (quoting Bruce Friedrich
of PETA).
15. David Shaw, Matters of Taste; Animal Rights and Wrongs; When It Comes to Defending
Livestock, Some Activists Are Going to Extremes, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2005, at F2 (quoting Lisa Lange
of PETA).
16. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 107–09 and accompanying text
(discussing enforcement of the Humane Slaughter Act).
17. See FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 99–100, 199–202. Grandin, who claims that her autism enables
her to understand the emotions of cows and other nonhumans, was the subject of a 1998 documentary,
Stairway to Heaven, by filmmaker Errol Morris. The title of the film is based on a ramp designed by
Grandin that is supposed to lead cows more calmly from the holding pen to their slaughter. Grandin
maintains that “[p]roperly performed, ‘slaughter is more humane than nature.’” OLIVER SACKS, AN
ANTHROPOLOGIST ON MARS 268 (1995) (quoting Temple Grandin). Grandin ignores that cows would
not die in “nature” as they would not exist if we did not cause them to come into being for the purpose
of eating them. See also TEMPLE GRANDIN & CATHERINE JOHNSON, ANIMALS IN TRANSLATION:
USING THE MYSTERIES OF AUTISM TO DECODE ANIMAL BEHAVIOR (2005) (discussing the ways in
which Grandin’s autism supposedly provides her with insight about animal cognition).
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difference between profit and loss. Research clearly demonstrates that many meat
quality benefits can be obtained with careful, quiet animal handling. . . . Properly
handled animals are not only an important ethical goal, they also keep the meat
18
industry running safely, efficiently and profitably.

In talking about stunning animals before slaughter, Grandin states:
Stunning an animal correctly will provide better meat quality. Improper electric
stunning will cause bloodspots in the meat and bone fractures. Good stunning
practices are also required so that a plant will be in compliance with the Humane
Slaughter Act and for animal welfare. When stunning is done correctly, the animal
feels no pain and it becomes instantly unconscious. An animal that is stunned properly
19
will produce a still carcass that is safe for plant workers to work on.

She maintains that “[g]entle handling in well-designed facilities will minimize
stress levels, improve efficiency and maintain good meat quality. Rough
handling or poorly designed equipment is detrimental to both animal welfare
and meat quality.”20
In discussing as a general matter the slaughter and battery-cage
improvements to which Singer refers, McDonald’s states:
Animal welfare is also an important part of quality assurance. For high-quality food
products at the counter, you need high quality coming from the farm. Animals that are
well cared for are less prone to illness, injury, and stress, which all have the same
negative impact on the condition of livestock as they do on people. Proper animal
welfare practices also benefit producers. Complying with our animal welfare
guidelines helps ensure efficient production and reduces waste and loss. This enables
21
our suppliers to be highly competitive.

Wendy’s also emphasizes the efficiency of its animal-welfare program:
“Studies have shown that humane animal handling methods not only prevent
needless suffering, but can result in a safer working environment for workers
involved in the farm and livestock industry.”22 In a report about voluntary
reforms in the livestock industry, the Los Angeles Times stated that “[i]n part,
the reforms are driven by self-interest. When an animal is bruised, its flesh turns
mushy and must be discarded. Even stress, especially right before slaughter, can
23
affect the quality of meat.”
In short, the producers of animal products—working with prominent animal
advocates—are becoming better at exploiting animals in an economically
efficient manner by adopting measures that improve meat quality and worker
safety. But this has absolutely nothing to do with any recognition that animals

18. TEMPLE GRANDIN, RECOMMENDED ANIMAL HANDLING GUIDELINES AND AUDIT GUIDE 6
(2005), available at http://www.animalhandling.org/guidelines/2005RecAnimalHandlingGuidelines.pdf.
19. Temple
Grandin,
Humane
Slaughter:
Recommended
Stunning
Practices,
http://www.grandin.com/humane/rec.slaughter.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
20. Temple Grandin, Stress and Meat Quality: Lowering Stress to Improve Meat Quality and
Animal Welfare, http://www.grandin.com/meat/meat.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
21. Bruce Feinberg & Terry Williams, Animal Welfare Update: North America,
http://www.mcdonalds.com/content/corp/values/report/archive/progress_report/north_america.html
(last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
22. Wendy’s, Wendy’s Animal Welfare Program, http://www.wendys.com/community/animal_
welfare.jsp (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
23. Simon, supra note 14.
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have inherent value or that they have interests that should be respected even
when it is not economically beneficial for humans to do so. Any supposed
improvements in animal welfare are limited to and justified by economic
benefits for institutional exploiters. Moreover, there is serious doubt whether
these changes actually provide any significant improvement in animal
treatment. A slaughterhouse that follows Grandin’s guidelines for stunning,
prod use, and other aspects of the killing process is still an unspeakably horrible
place and it is misleading for Singer, PETA, or anyone else to suggest
otherwise. Battery hens that supply some of the major fast-food chains may now
live in an area equivalent to a square of approximately 8.5 inches rather than
the average industry standard—a square of approximately 7.8 inches—but it
would be nonsense to claim that the existence of a battery hen in the larger cage
is anything but miserable. Indeed, “cage-free” hens are often packed together
so tightly in sheds that they are crushed and have very limited movement.
To the extent that McDonald’s and others are incurring any costs
whatsoever in making these changes, they are surely outweighed significantly by
the fact that these corporations can now point to the praise of animal advocates
such as Singer and PETA for their supposedly “humane” treatment of
nonhuman animals. PETA presented its 2004 Visionary of the Year Award to
Grandin, who is a consultant to McDonald’s and other fast-food chains, for her
“innovative improvements” in slaughtering processes.24 Some welfarists, such as
Paul Waldau, director of the Center for Animals and Public Policy at Tufts
University, proclaim that these supposed improvements in animal agriculture
indicate that “‘[a] certain segment of the population is beginning to consume
25
with conscience.’” This is precisely the sort of comment that encourages the
public to believe that it is now more acceptable to eat animal products because
animals are being treated more “humanely,” and that demonstrates the
generally counterproductive nature of animal welfare.
B. Legislation
A cursory review of federal and state animal-welfare legislation in the past
dozen years provides several notable examples of the sort of legislation
described in Rain Without Thunder as providing a greater benefit to animaladvocacy organizations, which need legislative “victories” to raise funds, than to
nonhuman animals.

24. PETA, http://www.peta.org/MC/NewsItem.asp?id=5667&pf=true (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
25. Patricia Leigh Brown, Is Luxury Cruel? The Foie Gras Divide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2004, at F10
(quoting Paul Waldau). See also infra notes 137–41 (discussing the idea that we can be “conscientious
omnivores”).
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1. Federal Legislation: The Chimpanzee Health Improvement,
26
Maintenance, and Protection (CHIMP) Act
The CHIMP Act of 2000 was enthusiastically supported by many national
animal-advocacy organizations and by primatologist Jane Goodall, and many
animal advocates regard the CHIMP Act as the most significant piece of federal
27
legislation since the 1985 amendments to the federal Animal Welfare Act,
itself an extremely modest law. The stated purpose of the CHIMP Act is to
establish a national sanctuary system for chimpanzees that are designated by
the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the Secretary) as no longer
28
needed for research conducted or supported by federal agencies. Chimpanzees
not owned by the federal government may also be accepted into the sanctuary
program if the owner transfers title and other conditions are met.29 The
sanctuary system is to be operated by a nonprofit private entity chosen by the
Secretary, and costs are to be shared, with the nonprofit entity paying not less
than ten percent of costs to establish the sanctuary and twenty-five percent of
the costs of operation.30
Although the Act purports to express a moral concern about chimpanzees
used in research, it is clear from the legislative history that Congress was at least
equally as concerned about the high costs of warehousing these nonhumans in
laboratories and regarded the sanctuary system as being a cost-effective
31
solution that would be financed in part through private funds. The CHIMP
Act was described as “fiscally sound legislation that will better serve the
taxpayers as well as the animals.”32 Animal advocates also promoted the
33
legislation as cost-efficient.

26. 42 U.S.C. § 287a-3a (2000) (establishing a sanctuary system for surplus chimpanzees).
27. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159 (2000). For a discussion of the Animal Welfare Act, see FRANCIONE,
supra note 1, at 185–249. See also infra notes 104–06 and accompanying text (discussing exclusion of
animals from coverage under the Act).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 287a-3a(a), (b).
29. Id. § 287a-3a(c), (d)(4).
30. Id. § 287a-3a(e)(4)(A), (B).
31. See 146 CONG. REC. S11654-55 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000). Senator Smith stated: “It costs $8-$15
per day per animal to care for chimpanzees in a sanctuary, where they live in groups in a naturalized
setting. That is compared to the $20-$30 per day per animal that the federal government is now
spending to maintain the chimpanzees in laboratory cages.” Id. at 11654. Senator Durbin added: “And
this legislation creates a public-private partnership, to generate non-federal dollars that will help pay
for the care of these chimpanzees. Right now, their care is financed strictly through taxpayer dollars.
Under the bill, the private sector will cover 10 percent of the start-up costs and 25 percent of the
operating costs of the sanctuary system.” Id. For further discussion on the legislative rationale for the
CHIMP Act, see S. REP. NO. 106-494, at 3 (2000) (“The CHIMP Act provides a cost-effective solution
to the long term care needs of these chimpanzees. Sanctuary care for animals requires less intensive
management than animals in research facilities, and therefore entails lower daily costs.”)
32. 146 CONG. REC. S11655 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000) (statement of Senator Durbin).
33. See, e.g., Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance, and Protection Act: Hearing on H.R.
3514 Before the Subcomm. on Health and Environment of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 34
(2000). Tina Nelson, Executive Director of the American Anti-Vivisection Society, stated: “I wish to
emphasize the cost effectiveness of this solution. Sanctuaries offer considerable savings compared to
the cost of housing chimpanzees in laboratories.” Nelson’s statement was offered on behalf of her own
organization as well as the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the National
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Moreover, the CHIMP Act was explicitly proposed as a way of ensuring that
research involving chimpanzees can continue. Senate sponsor Robert Smith (RNH) stated that the CHIMP Act was “basically a cost of doing business. If the
federal government wants to keep using chimpanzees for medical research, it
34
has to assume the responsibility for their care after the research is done.”
Euthanizing the animals was not an option:
“Some of the best and most caring members of the support staff, such as veterinarians
and technicians would, for personal and emotional reasons, find it impossible to
function effectively in an atmosphere in which euthanasia is a general policy, and
might resign. A facility that adopted such a policy could expect to lose some of its best
35
employees.”

According to Senator Smith, “because chimpanzees and humans are so similar,
those who work directly in chimpanzee research would find it untenable to
continue using these animals if they were to be killed at the conclusion of the
36
research.” Senate co-sponsor Richard Durbin (D-Ill) stated that “if the
Federal government is to keep using chimpanzees to advance human health
research goals, long-term care of the animals is a pre-requisite.”37 Like the
supposed improvements in farm-animal welfare discussed in the previous
section, the CHIMP Act provides yet another, and a particularly relevant,
illustration of a point made continually in my work: Animal-welfare measures,
which are regarded as a “cost of doing business,” may very well facilitate
continued animal exploitation by making it more acceptable.38
Although the CHIMP Act purports to prohibit further invasive research on
“retired” chimpanzees in the sanctuary system, the Act has two important
exceptions. First, sanctuary chimpanzees can be used for
noninvasive behavioral studies or medical studies based on information collected
during the course of normal veterinary care that is provided for the benefit of the
chimpanzee, provided that any such study involves minimal physical and mental harm,
pain, distress, and disturbance to the chimpanzee and the social group in which the
39
chimpanzee lives.

Second, the Act permits invasive research on a “retired” chimpanzee if the
Secretary finds that the research “is essential to address an important public
40
health need”; a sanctuary chimpanzee is needed because there is no other
chimpanzee “reasonably available” outside the sanctuary system with a similar

Anti-Vivisection Society, Society for Animal Protective Legislation, and The Humane Society of the
United States.
34. 146 CONG. REC. S11655 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000) (statement of Senator Smith).
35. Id. (quoting NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CHIMPANZEES IN RESEARCH: STRATEGIES
FOR THEIR ETHICAL CARE, MANAGEMENT, AND USE 39 (1997)).
36. Id. (statement of Senator Smith).
37. Id. (statement of Senator Durbin).
38. See generally FRANCIONE, supra note 3 (arguing that animal-welfare regulations do not lead to
the abolition of animal exploitation and, indeed, make exploitation more acceptable as a general
matter).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 287a-3a(d)(3)(A)(i) (2000).
40. Id. § 287a-3a(d)(3)(A)(ii)(III).

02__FRANCIONE.DOC

Winter 2007]

7/20/2007 9:34 AM

ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW

19

medical history and prior research protocol;41 and that there are “technological
or medical advancements that were not available at the time the chimpanzee
entered the sanctuary system, and that such advancements can and will be used
in the research.”42 The exception for invasive research also requires that “the
design of the research involves minimal pain and physical harm to the
chimpanzee, and otherwise minimizes mental harm, distress, and disturbance to
the chimpanzee and the social group in which the chimpanzee lives (including
with respect to removal of the chimpanzee from the sanctuary facility
involved).”43
The exception for noninvasive behavioral studies or medical studies is not
qualified, and it appears as though this research may be done without
limitation. Although the exception for invasive research appears to be carefully
qualified, it is easy to satisfy. If the government and researchers want to do
research, it is, by definition, to address an “important public health need.” No
two chimpanzees will have the exact same medical history even if they were
involved in the same research protocol, so this exception leaves the door wide
open for researchers to claim that a sanctuary chimpanzee is in some way or
other unique. Technological and medical advances occur every day and there is
no qualification as to what is required. The requirement that the design of any
invasive research involve “minimal” pain and harm is, in my view, as
meaningless as a requirement that we not impose “unnecessary” suffering on
animals.
Furthermore, whether the proposed design for invasive research satisfies the
exception is to be evaluated by the board of directors of the entity operating the
sanctuary system, and the Secretary must accept those findings unless he or she
44
finds them to be arbitrary or capricious. There is a notice-and-comment
45
requirement for research on sanctuary chimpanzees, and no one who has been
previously “fined for, or signed a consent decree for, any violation of the
Animal Welfare Act” can use a sanctuary chimpanzee for any research.46 There
is no review or approval mechanism specified in the Act for noninvasive
behavioral studies or medical studies.
Animal advocates who supported the CHIMP Act either failed to
appreciate that such a sanctuary system controlled by the government would
facilitate, and not inhibit, research on “retired” chimpanzees, or they ignored
47
that fact. Before the CHIMP Act, many chimps were being warehoused in

41. Id. § 287a-3a(d)(3)(A)(ii)(I).
42. Id. § 287a-3a(d)(3)(A)(ii)(II).
43. Id. § 287a-3a(d)(3)(A)(ii)(IV).
44. Id. § 287a-3a(d)(3)(B)(ii). The requirements for invasive research do not apply to noninvasive
behavioral studies or medical studies. Id. § 287a-3a(d)(3)(A)(i).
45. Id. § 287a-3a(d)(3)(B)(iii).
46. Id. § 287a-3a(d)(3)(C). This provision appears to apply to both noninvasive and invasive
research.
47. Some organizations that initially supported the CHIMP Act claimed to withdraw support when
the bill was amended to allow continued invasive research on sanctuary chimpanzees. This withdrawal
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laboratories, and record keeping was spotty at best. A vivisector trying to find
chimpanzees for particular experiments faced considerable opportunity costs in
locating suitable animals. The creation of a national sanctuary system under the
effective control of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
considerably reduces those opportunity costs through a centralized information
bank that makes the location and medical histories accessible to the research
community. This system allows vivisectors to locate supposedly unique
chimpanzees whose use in experiments will arguably satisfy the “public health
need” requirement.
Supporters of the CHIMP Act claimed that the exception for invasive
research was needed to get support for the bill by the National Institutes of
Health (NIH)—and that is precisely the problem. NIH was not willing to drop
its opposition unless sanctuary chimpanzees continued to be available for
research, which suggests that NIH regards these supposedly retired
chimpanzees as being more on a leave of absence. Many advocates pointed to
statements by legislators that invasive research on these chimpanzees “would
48
rarely, if ever, take place.” It must be remembered, however, that in the matter
of the “Silver Spring monkeys,” who were removed from a federally funded
laboratory after authorities determined that the animals were being treated in a
cruel manner, NIH made an explicit written representation to Congress that the
primates would never be used in experiments once they were transferred to the
Delta Regional Primate Center.49 Despite its commitment to Congress, NIH
allowed further experiments because the monkeys were claimed to be unique in
light of their previous medical histories. Congress complained strenuously but
NIH ignored the protest, claiming scientific need. It is unclear why any animal
advocate believes that the CHIMP Act sanctuary situation will not involve a
repeat of what occurred with the Silver Spring monkeys.
In the face of concerns expressed by myself and others about the CHIMP
Act before its enactment, animal advocates who supported the Act argued that
of support was often done quietly. For example, the American Anti-Vivisection Society, which actively
supported the bill, see supra note 33, claimed to withdraw support after the bill was amended, but this
withdrawal consisted only of a withdrawal of active support and not any public opposition to the bill.
See Letter from Tina Nelson, Executive Director of the American Anti-Vivisection Society, to Hon.
James Greenwood (Oct. 23, 2000) (on file with the author). I was unable to find any indication that
organizations that supported the Act objected at any point to the exception for noninvasive behavioral
research or medical studies, even though these may involve some level of harm, pain, distress, and
disturbance.
The National Institutes of Health proposed regulations to implement the CHIMP Act. See
Standards of Care for Chimpanzees Held in the Federally Supported Chimpanzee Sanctuary System, 70
Fed. Reg. 1843 (Jan. 11, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 9). A coalition of animal-protection
organizations commented on the proposed regulations and argued that there should be no further
research on animals in the “sanctuary” system. See Center for Great Apes, et al., Comment on
Proposed Rules for Chimpanzees Held in the Federally Supported Chimpanzee Sanctuary System,
(Mar. 14, 2005), http://www.neavs.org/downloads/programs/campaigns/Comments_on_Proposed_
Rules.pdf. As of the time that this essay went to press, the regulations were not available.
48. 146 CONG. REC. S11654 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000) (statement of Senator Smith).
49. For a discussion of the Silver Spring monkey case, including NIH representations to Congress,
see FRANCIONE, supra note 1, at 72–78, 86–89.
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the solution to the problem presented by the exception allowing invasive
research was to support the Act and then to challenge in court any
50
determination to use sanctuary chimpanzees in further research. The problem
is that, for all intents and purposes, it is virtually impossible to challenge the
discretionary decisions of an administrative agency.
First, it is not even clear that animal advocates would have legal standing to
bring a judicial challenge to a decision by the Secretary to allow use of a
“retired” chimpanzee in further research. That is, the court may very well
dismiss the challenge without considering the merits of the Secretary’s decision.
Second, and more important, even if animal advocates were found to have
standing, the applicable standard of judicial review would effectively insulate
these decisions from challenge. The CHIMP Act provides two levels of
protection to administrative decisions to perform experiments on sanctuary
chimpanzees. Under the Act, the sanctuary system is to be operated by a nonprofit organization that is awarded a contract by the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), or that is established by HHS.51 The board of directors
of the sanctuary is given the power to determine whether the design of invasive
research complies with the requirement to minimize pain and harm, and,
assuming that the Secretary determines that the other conditions are satisfied
(that is, that an exemption should be granted), the Secretary is bound by the
board’s determination unless it is arbitrary or capricious. In addition, the
Secretary’s determination about the board’s determination, as well as the
Secretary’s own determination about whether an exemption should be granted,
will be insulated from challenge unless it is can be demonstrated to be arbitrary
or capricious. Finally, the “retired” chimpanzees can be used without limit for
noninvasive behavioral studies or certain medical studies as long as only
“minimal physical and mental harm, pain, distress, and disturbance” are
involved, and there is no mechanism in the Act for review of this research.
In September 2002, the National Center for Research Resources of NIH
awarded the contract for the sanctuary to Chimp Haven, Inc., the board of
which includes several members who either are presently or who have been
involved with the use of nonhumans, including nonhuman primates, in
52
experiments. The board of Chimp Haven will determine whether the design of
a proposed experiment on a “retired” chimpanzee minimizes physical and

50. See, e.g., Statement of GAP [The Great Ape Project], Nov. 29, 2000 (on file with author):
“Some major supporters of GAP choose to support the amended bill (Jane Goodall, Marc Bekoff,
Steve Wise), arguing that the sanctuary should be created and then we should fight with all our might if
someone attempts to remove a ‘retired’ chimpanzee.” I was unable to find any discussion of concern
about noninvasive behavioral research or medical studies.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 287a-3a(e).
52. For the announcement by the National Center on Research Resources of the award of the
contract to Chimp Haven, Inc., see http://www.ncrr.nih.gov/compmed/cm_chimp.asp (last visited Mar.
19, 2007). For information about Chimp Haven, Inc., including its board of directors, see
http://www.chimphaven.org/about-board.cfm (last visited Mar. 19, 2007). Chimp Haven is apparently
facing financial difficulties. Melody Brumble, Chimp Haven Faces Money Problems, THE TIMES
(Shreveport, La.), Feb. 23, 2006, at 1A.
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mental harm, and that decision must be accorded deference by the Secretary
whose own decision about whether the board has acted properly, and whether
the research should be done at all, must also be accorded deference. In short,
decisions by the Secretary to allow invasive research on sanctuary chimpanzees
will be immune from any meaningful legal challenge, even if animal advocates
have standing to bring such a challenge. Although the Act contains a noticeand-comment provision so the public can comment about proposed
experiments on chimpanzees in the sanctuary system, federal agencies are
notorious for ignoring the often considerable public objection to animal use in
experiments.
In sum, the CHIMP Act recognized that a “sanctuary” system—particularly
one financed in part by and effectively approved by animal advocates—is a
much cheaper way to house these animals and makes continued use of
chimpanzees in research more acceptable to the public. The system lowers the
cost for researchers of identifying the existence of animals with particular
medical histories, and “retired” animals can still be used for certain noninvasive
behavioral or medical studies, and for invasive research if there is a “public
health need.” The Act fits perfectly the model of welfarist legislation that I have
described in that it has nothing to do with recognizing the inherent value of
nonhumans and everything to do with economics and perpetuating animal use.
The Act did not move any distance at all from the property paradigm; indeed, it
reinforced the notion that chimpanzees are commodities and that animalwelfare standards should be linked to the economically efficient exploitation of
those commodities.
2. State Legislation: Florida’s “Ban” on Gestation Crates
Many animal advocates see state law as a more fertile ground for welfarist
change than federal, but the results over the past years do not support that
view. Peter Singer characterizes the amendment in 2002 of the Florida
Constitution to “ban the keeping of pregnant sows in crates so narrow that they
cannot even turn around” as “[a]n even greater triumph” than the voluntary
changes in the handling and slaughter of animals used for food.53 Animal
advocates, led by The Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), Farm
Sanctuary, and others, succeeded in getting nearly 700,000 signatures to put on
the ballot a proposal to ban what are known as “gestation crates.” Florida
voters approved the proposal, and the Florida Constitution now makes it a

53. Singer, supra note 10, at 26. In response to the question, “In your opinion, what has been the
most important victory for the animal movement?,” Singer responded that in addition to a campaign
against vivisection by the late animal-welfare advocate Henry Spira, he would:
also put the recent referendum victory on sow crates [gestation crates] in Florida very near the
top, because that was the first time that a major form of factory farming has been banned in
any state in America, and it showed that the public is on our side, when they have a chance to
vote on the kind of confinement that is standard in factory farms.
COK Talks with Peter Singer, COMPASSION OVER KILLING, http://www.cok.net/abol/15/06.php (last
visited Mar. 19, 2007).
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misdemeanor to confine a pregnant pig in “an enclosure,” or to tether a
54
pregnant pig “in such a way that she is prevented from turning around freely.”
For a number of reasons, characterization of the Florida amendment as a
“triumph” demonstrates that the bar of progress is ridiculously low where
animal welfare measures are concerned. First, the campaign against gestation
crates, which began in Florida but is now being conducted in other states, is
based explicitly on economic considerations. Animal advocates promoted the
amendment as a way to keep larger, intensive hog operations out of Florida,
55
and thereby protect property values and tourism. These advocates maintain, as
a general matter, that alternatives to the gestation crate, such as group housing,
56
will reduce production costs and increase productivity. Second, there were
only two hog farmers in the state of Florida who were affected by the
57
amendment, and there was almost no opposition to the amendment. On the
other hand, large animal-advocacy organizations spent well more than $1
million on the campaign.58 Third, the amendment defines “enclosure” as “any
cage, crate or other enclosure in which a pig is kept for all or the majority of any
59
day,” and this would presumably mean that the use of a gestation crate for less
than the majority of a day would not be prohibited. Fourth, the amendment
explicitly allows the use of the gestation crate for “prebirthing period,” which is

54. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 21(a). The amendment takes effect in 2008. See id. § 21(g) (effective six
years after approval by voters).
55. According to Floridians for Humane Farms, the Amendment “will prevent mega hog factories
from moving into Florida as they have in North Carolina. We don’t want Florida to follow North
Carolina’s experience where the environment has been damaged, property values have gone down, and
the tourist industry has suffered.” Floridians for Humane Farms, http://www.bancruelfarms.org/
faq_print.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
56. The Humane Society of the United States, which, with Farm Sanctuary, is promoting the
prohibition of gestation crates in other states, focuses heavily on the economic argument, and maintains
that European studies demonstrate that sows raised in group housing with electronic sow feeding are
generally more healthy, sow productivity is higher, and production costs are lower. THE HUMANE
SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, AN HSUS REPORT: THE ECONOMICS OF ADOPTING
ALTERNATIVE PRODUCTION SYSTEMS TO GESTATION CRATES (2006) [hereinafter HSUS REPORT:
GESTATION CRATES], available at http://www.hsus.org/web-files/PDF/farm/econ_gestation.pdf. A
similar proposal on crates for sows, also applicable to calves, was passed in Arizona in November 2006,
and Smithfield Foods stated in January 2007 that it would phase out gestation crates over a ten-year
period. See The Humane Society of the United States Praises Smithfield Move to End Confinement of
Pigs in Gestation Crates, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Jan. 25, 2007, http://news.corporate.findlaw.com/prnewswire/
20070125/25jan20071000.html. Time constraints and editorial deadlines made it impossible to discuss
these developments in this article, but they do not in any way affect my view that welfare reforms are
generally linked to the efficient exploitation of animals.
57. The only two Florida hog farms that used gestation crates sent their animals to slaughter and
closed their hog operations. Both could be eligible for state grants of up to $275,000. Allison North
Jones, State Hog Farmers Receive a Bailout from Lawmakers, TAMPA TRIB., May 14, 2005, at Metro 1.
58. Curtis Krueger, 1.2-Million Greases Path of Pig Proposal, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 13,
2002, at 1B. The Florida Elections Commission charged Farm Sanctuary and its president, Gene
Bauston, with 210 violations of Florida law for collecting “thousands of dollars in donations and
funnel[ing] them to the amendment campaign, violating a law that requires that the names of all
contributors be disclosed.” See Lucy Morgan, Panel Says Pig Proposal Backers Broke Election Law, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 30, 2002, at 5B.
59. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 21(c)(1). This is significant because some producers are moving toward a
modified system in which pregnant sows will be confined for part of the day.
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defined as “the seven day period prior to a pig’s expected date of giving birth,”60
and allows for the use of crates for “veterinary purposes” for a period “not
61
longer than reasonably necessary.” Like the “unnecessary suffering” language
discussed earlier, any legal standard concerning nonhumans that allows an
action to be done if, or as long as, “reasonably necessary” is an invitation to
ignore relevant animal interests. Fifth, although advocates suggested that the
amendment would likely result in any affected pigs being raised in group
62
housing systems, the amendment provides only that the pig must be able to
turn around “without having to touch any side of the pig’s enclosure”63 and not
that the pig must be kept in group housing. Sixth, the amendment served as the
“poster child” for a successful campaign to require a supermajority to amend
the Florida Constitution and thereby restrict such initiatives in the future.64
The Florida amendment may have been a fund-raising “triumph” for animal
organizations that claim it as a victory. But the amendment and similar efforts
do little to help animals and, indeed, are counterproductive. HSUS claims that
farmers who adopt alternatives to the gestation crates can not only increase
productivity and decrease production costs, but can “increase demand for their
65
products or earn a market premium.” Making exploitation more efficient and
increasing demand for meat have nothing to do with recognizing the inherent
value of animals or doing anything other than treating animals strictly as
economic commodities.
3. State Legislation: California’s Foie Gras “Ban”
The state law that has elicited the most enthusiastic response from animal
advocates, however, was passed in California. In 2004, Governor
Schwarzenegger signed into law Senate Bill 1520, which nominally prohibits the
66
force feeding of birds to produce foie gras and the sale of products that are the
“result of force feeding a bird for the purpose of enlarging the bird’s liver
beyond normal size.”67 Senate Bill 1520, characterized as “an ‘unprecedented
60. Id. § 21(b)(2), (c)(6).
61. Id. § 21(b)(1).
62. See, e.g., Ban Cruel Farms, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.bancruelfarms.org/
faq_print.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2007) (“In European countries where similar legislation has been
enacted, pig farmers have generally gone to a group housing system where the sows are kept together
in more spacious conditions.”).
63. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 21(c)(5).
64. Etan Horowitz, Amending Constitution Polarizes Sides, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 4, 2006, at
B1. Supporters of the amendment offered as “[t]heir poster child: a $1.6 million campaign by animalrights groups in 2002 that won passage of an amendment preventing the caging of pregnant pigs, an
amendment that affected only two farmers in the state.” Id. The supermajority amendment was
approved by voters on November 7, 2006. Howard Troxler, Stop Us Before We Amend Again!, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, at 8A. The first line of the article reads: “It must have been the
pregnant pigs that did it.” Id.
65. HSUS REPORT: GESTATION CRATES, supra note 56, at 2.
66. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25980–84. (Deering 2005).
67. Id. § 25982. Some animal advocates have claimed that consumption of foie gras in California
will be prohibited after July 1, 2012. This claim is unwarranted. Californians will still be able to
purchase foie gras from sellers outside of California for personal use but may not resell it within the
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victory for animals,’”68 was supported by most of the large animal-advocacy
69
groups and by numerous celebrities.
The California law is one of the few instances in which animal welfare is not
linked explicitly to economic concerns. That is, the law does not seek to make
exploitation more “humane” incidental to making it more beneficial
economically through lowering costs or increasing productivity. Although foie
gras certainly involves the barbarous treatment of animals, so does most of our
other animal food. Foie gras is unusual because it is not part of domestic food
culture; indeed, it is associated with France, toward which many Americans are
hostile as the result of various political differences. It is produced in the United
States by only two companies, and is consumed by the relatively few people
who can afford it and regard it as a desirable luxury. Foie gras is analogous in
certain respects to bullfighting, which is no more barbaric than rodeos or some
other, more traditionally American, forms of animal “entertainment,” but,
because fois gras is a “foreign” form of exploitation, can inspire passionate
70
opposition.
Although Senate Bill 1520 may arguably be said to recognize that at least
some animals have more than extrinsic or conditional value, there are a number
of reasons why the law is more properly characterized as a victory for
California’s only foie gras producer, Sonoma Foie Gras. First, the law does not
take effect until July 1, 2012, and it explicitly provides that this date reflects “the
express intention of the Legislature . . . to allow a seven and one-half year
period for persons or entities engaged in agricultural practices that include
71
raising and selling force fed birds to modify their business practices.” In
transmitting the signed bill to the Senate, Governor Schwarzenegger stated:
This bill provides [seven] and one half years for agricultural husbandry practices to evolve
and perfect a humane way for a duck to consume grain to increase the size of its liver
through natural processes. If agricultural producers are successful in this endeavor, the ban
72
on foie gras sales and production in California will not occur.

state. Restaurants may be able to continue to serve foie gras if it is served as a “chef’s gift” with a meal
and is not sold. The legislation has no effect on the production, marketing, or consumption of liver from
birds who have not been force fed.
68. 2004 Legislative Review, 11 ANIMAL L. 325, 360 (2005) (quoting HSUS sources).
69. Andrew Gumbel & John Lichfield, An Ending Made in Hollywood for an Epic Fight Over Foie
Gras; The Headlines Proclaim That Arnold Schwarzenegger Has Saved the Geese, THE INDEPENDENT
(LONDON), Oct. 1, 2004, at 12.
70. See, e.g., Justin Berton, When All Else Fails, Throw Your Muleta at the Bull and Run, S.F.
CHRON., June 18, 2006, at A1 (describing the experience of Americans at a bullfighting school in
California). Another example of this phenomenon involves animal sacrifices. Practitioners of a
Caribbean religion known as Santeria—usually immigrants and people of color—have been prosecuted
for conducting ritual animal sacrifice as part of their religion. Animal sacrifice, although quite horrific,
is really no different from what goes on at a federally regulated slaughterhouse. See FRANCIONE, supra
note 2, at 163–64 (discussing prohibitions of particular practices associated with other cultures or
certain socioeconomic groups).
71. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25984(a), (c) (Deering 2005).
72. Governor’s Message to the California State Senate on Signing Cal. S.B. 1520 (Sept. 29, 2004),
available at LEXIS, 2003 Legis. Bill Hist. CA S.B. 1520.

02__FRANCIONE.DOC

26

7/20/2007 9:34 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 70:9

Second, the law explicitly provides that Sonoma Foie Gras is immunized
until July 1, 2012, from civil or criminal lawsuits concerning the practice of force
feeding or sale of products resulting from that practice, and that any pending
civil action against Sonoma concerning the practice of force feeding shall not
73
proceed. This immunity has the practical effect of legalizing force feeding until
2012, although the status of that practice was in question at the time the law was
passed.
Third, the owner of Sonoma Foie Gras, Guillermo Gonzalez, actually
supported the law and lobbied for its passage. He stated that “‘[w]e will go on
with our business’” and “‘[w]e supported this bill and thank the governor and
the legislature for their very serious consideration and deliberation.’”74
Gonzalez “professed to welcome the measure, which grants him immunity from
lawsuits, and gives him seven and a half years, in the governor’s words, ‘for
animal husbandry practices to evolve’ and to ‘perfect a humane way for a duck
to consume grain to increase the size of its liver through natural processes.’”75
76
But Gonzalez also “hopes to use the reprieve to prove the ducks do not suffer”
and he will “work with scientists and scholars to find ‘clear, unbiased answers
on the question of the welfare of the ducks,’ including stress tests.”77 Mr.
Gonzalez claims to have already identified animal scientists who maintain that
78
force feeding does not cause animals to suffer. Further,
[t]he University of California-Davis has been working behind the scenes with the
governor’s office to put a plan into place that would allow the university’s animal
science department and the veterinary medicine school to conduct research to

73. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25984(b)(1), provides that “[n]o civil or criminal cause of
action shall arise on or after January 1, 2005, nor shall a pending action commenced prior to January 1,
2005, be pursued under any provision of law against a person or entity for engaging, prior to July 1,
2012, in any act prohibited by this chapter.” Section 25984(b)(3) provides that this immunity applies
only “to persons or entities who were engaged in, or controlled by persons or entities who were
engaged in, agricultural practices that involved force feeding birds at the time of the enactment of this
chapter.” Sonoma Foie Gras was the only producer of foie gras involved in the force feeding of birds at
the time that the law was enacted. See Gumbel & Lichfield, supra note 69. “Until 2012, meanwhile,
Sonoma Foie Gras will be immune from all lawsuits—two of which had been pending before the courts
but will now be dropped.” Id.
When Governor Schwarzenegger signed Senate Bill 1520 into law, a number of animal advocacy
groups announced the signing as a victory for animals, and not one that I saw mentioned that any
pending civil action against Sonoma would be dismissed and that Sonoma was immunized from civil
and criminal action until 2012. For example, Farm Sanctuary, an organization that sponsored the
legislation, omitted any reference to these crucial facts. See NoFoieGras.org, Schwarzenegger
Terminates Form of Animal Cruelty, http://nofoiegras.org/FS_cabill_PR2.htm (last visited Apr. 1,
2007).
74. Gumbel & Lichfield, supra note 69 (quoting Guillermo Gonzalez).
75. Brown, supra note 25.
76. Gabrielle Banks, Duck Farm Is on Capitol Agenda; The Owner’s Production of Foie Gras is the
Focus of Legislation That Would Ban Force-Feeding of the Birds, Decried as Cruel, L.A. TIMES, July 7,
2004, at B1.
77. Brown, supra note 25.
78. Id.
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determine whether foie gras production is humane. If the research indicates that the
79
process is humane, it could be used as ammunition to challenge the law.

Moreover, the California legislature may well repeal the law or modify it to
allow force feeding with specially designed equipment or accompanied by the
use of drugs that supposedly mitigate any suffering if the legislature determines
that such changes make the practice “humane.” Given that the legislature
expressed its intention to delay the effective date of the law precisely to allow
those involved in force feeding birds “to modify their business practices,” such
an outcome seems more likely than not.
Senate Bill 1520 provides an excellent example of why animal-welfare
legislation is so problematic. This law requires the dismissal of pending
litigation and effectively insulates the industry completely at least until 2012
although the prohibition is unlikely ever to come into effect in any event. In the
meantime, researchers will use animals in painful experiments in order to
determine whether force feeding is “humane” or to develop a way to get
enlarged liver through “natural processes.” If by some miracle the law does
come into effect in 2012, these birds will still be able to be raised intensively and
slaughtered. Although they may not have tubes shoved down their throats, their
livers will be enlarged in some way determined to be “natural,” or about which
there will be litigation for years, and the birds will continue to live bleak lives.
Moreover, this sort of law deludes people into thinking that animal welfare
works, that things are getting significantly better for nonhumans whom we
exploit for food, and that we can “consume with conscience.”80
The California foie gras law was such a victory for Sonoma Foie Gras that
the only other domestic producer of foie gras, Hudson Valley Foie Gras, in
upstate New York, is seeking to have a similar law passed in New York that
would provide complete immunity from any criminal prosecution or civil action
through 2016 for force feeding birds.81
82

C. Legal Standing: Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman

As far as judicial decisions are concerned, animal advocates have stated that
Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman provides broad standing to sue to
83
“enforce the Animal Welfare Act.” It is, however, more accurate to

79. Carolyn Jung, Study Could Disrupt Planned Foie Gras Ban, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct.
27, 2004, at 1F.
80. See Brown, supra note 25.
81. Lawrence Downes, Face to Face With the Foie Gras Problem, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2005, at 11:
“One Senate sponsor, John Bonacic, is an upstate Republican who says he has no special sympathy for
ducks or geese, despite what his bill says. He says he wants only to help a Sullivan County constituent—
Hudson Valley Foie Gras, the nation’s leading producer of fresh foie gras, which has not only lobbied
for the bill, but also helped to write it.”
82. 154 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
83. The Legal Status of Nonhuman Animals, 8 ANIMAL L. 1, 3–4 (2002) (comment by David
Favre). See also Favre, supra note 7, at 95 (claiming that Glickman held that there was standing “to
question the decisions of a federal agency” concerning animals). Favre is a national officer of the
Animal Legal Defense Fund.
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characterize the case as providing a “small window for standing”84 in certain
limited situations.
In Glickman, an animal advocate claimed that he suffered aesthetic injury
when he visited a game farm and saw nonhuman primates in what he regarded
as inhumane conditions. He argued that if the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA), which enforces the Animal Welfare Act, had
promulgated appropriate regulations as required under the 1985 Amendments
85
to the Act, the animals would not have been in these conditions. An en banc
D.C. Circuit held that the advocate had standing to challenge the failure of
USDA to promulgate regulations to establish minimum requirements for a
physical environment that would promote the psychological well-being of
primates.
The plaintiff did not appeal the portion of the lower-court ruling which held
that agency decisions to enforce the Animal Welfare Act were generally not
reviewable by courts as such decisions were committed to the discretion of the
agency.86 The appellate court holding was limited only to whether the advocate
was standing to challenge the failure of the agency to promulgate regulations as
required under the Act. Therefore, assertions that Glickman established
standing to enforce the Act are not correct.
Moreover, the appellate court explicitly distinguished the situation of the
game farm from the use of primates or other animals in experiments because, in
the latter situation, Congress had explicitly provided for oversight in the form of
87
an animal-care committee with “private citizen members.” Therefore, claims
by animal advocates that Glickman provided for standing to challenge the use
of animals in experiments are unfounded.
Finally, en banc consideration was limited to the question of the standing of
the individual advocate, and the court left for a future panel of the court review
of the trial court’s finding that the agency did violate the Act by failing to
promulgate adequate regulations. A subsequent panel of the Court of Appeals
considered the claim on the merits and held that the standards that were
promulgated by USDA, which in essence delegated the development of
standards to on-site veterinarians employed by the dealers, research facilities,
and exhibitors covered by the Act, were sufficient.88
In sum, it is inaccurate to characterize Glickman as anything more than a
narrow decision based only on the aesthetic interests of the plaintiff and not the
interests of nonhumans, in a situation in which Congress had not provided other
84. Rebecca J. Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best Friend: The Moral and Legal Status of
Companion Animals, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 47, 81 (2002).
85. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(2)(B) (2000).
86. Glickman, 154 F.3d at 431 n.3.
87. Id. at 445.
88. Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 204 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The appellate
court reversed a trial court decision, Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 943 F. Supp. 44
(D.D.C. 1996), which held that the USDA had not promulgated the regulations required by the Animal
Welfare Act.
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oversight mechanisms. Moreover, the subsequent litigation made clear that
regulations that provide no meaningful protection for animal interests will
suffice.
D. Additional Failures of the Welfarist Approach
The foregoing is not intended to be a complete survey of all developments
that have occurred in the past dozen years. Rather, it focuses on what most
animal advocates regard as the most significant advances during that period.
There certainly have been some minor successes, particularly at the state level.
For example, many states have now made felonies of at least some violations of
state anticruelty laws,89 and a number of states have increased penalties and
closed loopholes concerning animal fighting.90 But given the amount of time,
energy, and money that has been expended by the animal-protection
movement, a complete lack of success would be as shocking as what animal
advocates appear to regard as major victories. Moreover, anticruelty laws affect
a relatively small number of nonhumans, and animal fighting is one of the very
few activities that we have historically been willing to prohibit. The brutal
Hegins Pigeon Shoot, where thousands of pigeons were killed and wounded in a
carnival-like setting every Labor Day in Hegins, Pennsylvania, which had for
many years been the target of protests by animal advocates, was stopped by its
organizers, but live bird shoots continue throughout Pennsylvania.91
There have been, however, no major success stories. Fur was a major target
of animal organizations throughout the 1990s. Peter Singer claims that, as the
result of efforts of animal advocates, the fur industry has been damaged and has
92
not recovered. Singer’s claim is unfounded. Although fur sales in the United
States fell in the 1990s to a reported $1 billion, “[s]ince 1999, sales have climbed
steadily, reaching a record $1.8 billion in 2003.”93 The sale of furs “jumped to
94
$11.3 billion worldwide in 2002, from $8.1 billion in 1998.” There has been a
dramatic increase in the number of stores carrying fur and the number of
designers using fur combined with a significant drop in the average age of fur
95
buyers. “In 2004, a Gallup poll found that 63 percent of respondents

89. Stephan K. Otto, State Animal Protection Laws—The Next Generation, 11 ANIMAL L. 131, 13438 (2005). See also FRANCIONE, supra note 2, at 68 (discussing whether this change will make any
difference given the scope of application of anticruelty laws, the mens rea requirement, and the general
reluctance to prosecute anticruelty cases); infra notes 174–78 and accompanying text (discussing
anticruelty laws generally).
90. 2004 Legislative Review, supra note 68, at 351–54 (2005).
91. Ian Urbina, Animal Lovers See an Interstate Trade in Moving Targets, N.Y. TIMES, June 10,
2004, at B1. For a description of the Hegins event, see FRANCIONE, supra note 1, at xiii–xv.
92. Singer, supra note 10, at 25.
93. Julie Scelfo, Real Fur Is Fun Again, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 11, 2004, at 48.
94. Lizette Alvarez, ‘New Fur’ Doesn’t Look as if It Ever Kept a Mink Warm, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15,
2004, at A4.
95. Wendy Navratil, Fur’s Hot Again; The Animal-Rights Message Has Skipped a Generation, CHI.
TRIB. Jan. 18, 2004, at Q1.
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pronounced the buying and wearing of clothing made with animal fur ‘morally
96
acceptable.’”
The failure of the anti-fur campaign presents a case study in the failure of
welfarist strategy. Even advocacy organizations that purport to oppose all fur
garments, including those made from “ranch-raised” animals, have routinely
focused on the fur of certain animals, such as dogs and cats, or seals, as
97
somehow morally distinguishable from the fur of other nonhumans. This
nonsensical distinction, combined with the general failure of the movement to
confront squarely that clothing made from other animal parts, such as leather
and wool, is no less morally problematic than fur, has understandably made
many people conclude that the campaign against fur is arbitrary. Finally,
PETA’s continued use of sexist campaigns to oppose fur (and other animal
uses) has alienated many progressives and has trivialized the issue of fur in
particular and animal exploitation in general.98
There have been a considerable number of instances in which animal
advocates have failed to get even modest and ostensibly uncontroversial
legislative changes. For example, attempts starting in 1975 to get a federal ban
on leghold traps, which are prohibited or seriously restricted in only a handful
of states, have been unsuccessful even though these traps are illegal in
99
approximately ninety countries. Attempts to pass a federal law to provide for
the immediate and “humane” euthanasia of non-ambulatory, or “downed”
100
animals, have been unsuccessful. Efforts by legislators to ban shooting animals
in enclosed areas, or “canned hunts,” have been unsuccessful on the federal
level, and only about half the states have laws that prohibit or regulate this
activity even though many hunting groups regard these captive “hunts” as
unsporting.101 Despite decades of protests and boycotts by animal advocates, the
Canadian seal cull continues, and the Canadian “government announced in
102
2003 a three-year total allowable catch of 975,000 animals.”

96. Rob Walker, The Way We Live Now: Consumed; Pelt Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2006, at 30.
97. For example, both PETA, FurIsDead.com, China's Shocking Dog and Cat Fur Trade,
http://www.furisdead.com/feat-dogcatfur.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2007), and HSUS, Dog and Cat
Victims of the Fur Trade, http://www.hsus.org/furfree/dogs_cats/dog_and_cat_victims.html (last visited
Mar. 19, 2007), recommend that consumers purchase no fur products, but have campaigns that focus on
dog and cat fur. See infra note 102 on the seal campaign.
98. I have often discussed PETA’s use of sexism in campaigns. See, e.g., FRANCIONE, supra note 3,
at 74–76.
99. 2003 Legislative Review, 10 ANIMAL L. 363, 364–67 (2004).
100. Id. at 367–70.
101. 2002 Legislative Review, 9 ANIMAL L. 331, 338–40 (2003).
102. Canadian Press, Eyes of World on Seal Hunt That Starts Tomorrow, GUELPH MERCURY, Mar.
24, 2006, at A6. A number of animal-advocacy organizations, including HSUS, have formed a coalition,
the ProtectSeals Network, to end the seal slaughter through a boycott of Canadian seafood. The
Network urges those opposed to the seal slaughter to sign a pledge “not to buy Canadian seafood
products such as snow crab, cod, scallops, and shrimp until Canada ends its commercial seal hunt for
good.” The petition may be found at https://community.hsus.org/campaign/protectseals (last visited
Mar. 19, 2007). This suggests, of course, that sea animals have a different moral status than do seals,
and implies that it is acceptable to eat Canadian seafood as soon as the commercial seal hunt ends.
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This article does not discuss the myriad instances in which there were new
laws that actually have moved the animal-welfare agenda backward and have
sought to strengthen or expand animal exploitation in various respects. For
example, a number of states are strengthening protections for hunters and
preempting restrictions on hunting through amendments to make hunting a
constitutional right.103 There are, however, two examples involving the primary
federal animal-welfare laws—the federal Animal Welfare Act and the federal
Humane Slaughter Act—that demonstrate just how ineffective animal-welfare
legislation is and thus deserve special mention.
The first example involves the application of the federal Animal Welfare
104
Act to rats, mice, and birds—approximately ninety percent of the animals
used in laboratories. In 1970, Congress amended the Act to define “animal” to
include “any live or dead dog, cat, monkey (nonhuman primate mammal),
guinea pig, hamster, rabbit, or such other warm-blooded animal, as the
Secretary [of Agriculture] may determine is being used, or is intended for use,
for research, testing, experimentation, or exhibition purposes, or as a pet.”105
The Secretary consistently refused to determine that rats, mice, and birds were
used for research or were pets, and for thirty years, animal advocates tried in a
variety of ways to challenge this exclusion by the Secretary. In 2002, after the
Secretary agreed to a regulation that would include rats, mice, and birds,
Congress amended the Act to explicitly exclude rats, mice, and birds bred for
use in research,106 thus ending one of the longest campaigns in the history of the
animal-protection movement and establishing that the minimal provisions of
the Act do not apply to the overwhelming percentage of nonhumans used in
biomedical research in the United States.

103. 2003 Legislative Review, supra note 99, at 378–82 (2004).
104. See supra note 27. Singer acknowledges that it is not possible to know the number of animals
used in experiments in the United States, but he claims that estimates “suggest a similar story” of
significant decline as in Britain. Singer, supra note 10, at 25. Putting aside the validity of this claim as
applied to Britain, see note 10 supra, it is unclear how Singer can make such a claim about the United
States since rats, mice, and birds, which account for over ninety percent of the nonhumans used in the
United States, are not covered by the Animal Welfare Act and their numbers are not reported.
Therefore, no one knows the number of animals used. Government statistics on the relatively small
numbers of animals covered by the Act indicate that animal use has decreased somewhat but not in the
dramatic way Singer suggests. See, e.g., USDA, ANIMAL WELFARE REP. FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 10
(2004), available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ac/awreports/awreport2004.pdf.
105. Animal Welfare Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-579, 84 Stat. 1560, 1561 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. § 2132(g) (2000)).
106. The exclusion of rats, mice, and birds from the definition of “animal” in the Animal Welfare
Act was included as title X, subtitle D, section 10301, of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107–171, 116 Stat. 134 (2002). The exclusion is now codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g)
(2002). All vertebrate animals used in activities conducted or supported by the Public Health Service
(PHS) are regulated in accordance with PHS policy. See OFFICE OF LABORATORY ANIMAL WELFARE,
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE POLICY ON HUMANE CARE AND USE
OF LABORATORY ANIMALS 8 (2002)
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The second example involves the other major centerpiece of animal welfare,
107
the federal Humane Slaughter Act. In 2001, The Washington Post published a
story exposing widespread serious violations of the Act in slaughterhouses
across the country.108 This report, which discussed incidents such as the skinning
and dismemberment of animals who were still alive, made clear that the Act
was doing little to alleviate the suffering of nonhumans being slaughtered and
that the USDA was not enforcing the Act. The response was a resolution
stating that it is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Agriculture should
enforce the Act and “prevent needless suffering.”109 It is unclear which is more
disturbing—the meaningless congressional response, or the reaction of the
animal-protection community that the resolution is meaningful coupled with the
persistent belief of many animal advocates that the Humane Slaughter Act is a
significant piece of legislation in the first place.
III
PROPERTY: STRUCTURAL LIMITS ON THE PROTECTION OF THE INTERESTS OF
NONHUMANS
We could, of course, treat animals better than we do even if they retained
their status as our property. For instance, the treatment of animals in certain
European countries may be marginally better than it is in the United States,
110
although animals have property status in those countries as well. But it is
important to understand that the property paradigm presents important
structural and practical limitations on the human–animal relationship.
Moreover, if we do accord protection to animal interests beyond what is
required to be protected in order to facilitate their exploitation in a cost-

107. See supra note 4. The United States Department of Agriculture, which enforces the Humane
Slaughter Act, interprets the Act to exclude poultry, which account for the largest number of animals
slaughtered for food. See 9 C.F.R. §§ 313.1–.90 (2006). The exclusion of poultry under the Humane
Slaughter Act parallels the exclusion of rats and mice under the Animal Welfare Act (although rats and
mice are covered under other federal laws). See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text. Animal
advocates, led by HSUS, filed a lawsuit over the USDA’s exclusion of poultry. See Elizabeth
Williamson, Humane Society to Sue Over Poultry Slaughtering; Suit Demands That Birds Be Killed or
Rendered Unconscious Before Butchering, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2005, at B02. HSUS argues that the
present system of stunning poultry in an electrified water bath causes illness in humans through fecal
contamination and increases injuries to slaughterhouse workers. The alternative proposed by HSUS is
“controlled atmospheric killing,” or gassing, of poultry. According to HSUS, this alternative “results in
cost savings and increased revenues by decreasing carcass downgrades, contamination, and
refrigeration costs; increasing meat yields, quality, and shelf life; and improving worker conditions” and
“can improve worker conditions and safety, decreasing labor costs due to production line inefficiencies,
injuries, and turnover from handling conscious birds.” THE HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED
STATES, AN HSUS REPORT: THE ECONOMICS OF ADOPTING ALTERNATIVE PRODUCTION
PRACTICES TO ELECTRICAL STUNNING SLAUGHTER OF POULTRY 2 (2006), available at
http://www.hsus.org/web-files/PDF/farm/econ_elecstun.pdf.
108. Joby Warrick, ‘They Die Piece by Piece’; In Overtaxed Plants, Humane Treatment of Cattle Is
Often a Battle Lost, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2001, at A01.
109. The resolution on “humane” slaughter was included as title X, subtitle D, section 10305 of the
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat. 134 (2002).
110. See supra note 10.

02__FRANCIONE.DOC

Winter 2007]

7/20/2007 9:34 AM

ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW

33

effective manner, that may in a formal sense represent a diminution of the
property status of the nonhuman, but it would not necessarily represent a
recognition of the inherent value of nonhumans or be a step in the direction of
recognizing the right of a nonhuman not to be treated as the property of
111
humans. Also, such additional protection, like animal-welfare measures
generally, may perpetuate and even increase animal exploitation by making
people feel better about supposedly more “humane” animal exploitation.
In discussing my views on animals as property, Professor Cass Sunstein
claims that there is nothing inherent in property status that limits the
protections that we can provide to animals and that property ownership is
limited in all sorts of ways. He notes:
You own your house, but you are probably not allowed to burn it down or blow it up,
or to use it as a concert hall. You own your stereo, but if you have nearby neighbors
you cannot play music as loud as you want. In most domains, the rights of “owners”
112
are severely qualified.

Sunstein argues that “the status of ‘owner’ is not incompatible, in principle, with
a firm commitment to preventing the unnecessary suffering of animals or even
113
with treating animals as beings with both legal rights and intrinsic value.” He
claims that “[t]he fact of ownership even protects animals in important ways”
114
through the duties imposed by animal-welfare laws. He argues that we should
seek to ban and to restrict “the most indefensible practices” concerning
nonhumans.115 Sunstein’s position is problematic in several respects.116

111. See FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 190–219 (discussing welfarist changes that may represent
incremental eradication of the property status of nonhumans); see also infra notes 132–55 and
accompanying text (discussing new welfarism and incremental change, including whether changes result
in change in property status).
112. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 44.
113. Id. Similarly, David Favre argues that “[i]t is an incorrect legal analysis that the interests of
animals cannot be accommodated within the legal system if they remain legal property.” Favre, supra
note 7, at 91. He states that we can accord animals “the legal respect that they deserve,” id., “by
dividing the concept of title into legal and equitable categories and then awarding the equitable title to
the animal.” Id. at n.11. Putting aside the lack of clarity of the expression “the legal respect that they
deserve,” there are at least three responses to Favre’s proposal. First, however Favre wants to
characterize it, what he is doing is proposing limits on property ownership. It is not clear why he thinks
that going about this limitation in the rather peculiar way that he proposes will be any more socially or
legally acceptable than would the conceptually more simple prohibitions on the use of animals that are
presently available and largely rejected. Second, to the extent that the rights of “equitably self-owned”
nonhumans will be shaped by anticruelty laws, as Favre proposes, nonhumans will receive little
protection because anticruelty laws provide almost no protection to animals. Third, Favre also suggests
that the human–nonhuman relationship be modeled on the parent–child relationship, which does not
address anything more than the relationship that humans have with companion animals and would have
no application to nonhumans used in other contexts.
114. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 44. Sunstein once again finds an ally in David Favre. See David Favre,
Equitable Self-Ownership for Animals, 50 DUKE L.J. 473, 495 (2000) (“Under our present system, full
responsibility comes with ownership.”). See infra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing the
“benefit” that nonhumans receive from property status).
115. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 43.
116. For a further discussion of Sunstein’s views, see Gary L. Francione, Equal Consideration and
the Interest of Nonhuman Animals in Continued Existence: A Response to Professor Sunstein, 2006 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 231.
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A. Animal Property and Animal Interests
Sunstein is, of course, correct to say that property ownership is qualified and
limited, but he ignores certain aspects of property theory and the distinction
between property and persons, which make his comments inapplicable to
animal property. Although there are limitations on how we use our property,
those limits are imposed to benefit other persons (natural or corporate); they
are not imposed for the benefit of the property itself. It is true that I cannot
burn my house down or blast my stereo so that it disturbs my neighbors. But
that is because we are concerned about the effect of my actions on other
persons—others who may be in or near my house when I set it ablaze or my
neighbors, who might be trying to sleep. Prohibitions on the destruction of
landmarks are not imposed for the benefit of the property involved but to
protect human interests in the enjoyment of that property.
Sunstein is also correct to note that “current law forbids people from
117
treating animals however they wish to treat them.” But he overemphasizes the
extent to which the law regulates our treatment of animals. Although the law
requires that I provide food and shelter to my dog, there is nothing to stop me
from beating her on a regular basis to train her as a guard dog or to discipline
her, or from keeping her on a chain in the back yard and never having contact
with her, or from taking her to a veterinarian and having her “put to sleep” for
no reason other than that I no longer want her. Indeed, I can as a general
matter kill her myself as long as I do so in a “humane” way and as long as I do
not violate other laws and regulations that are not in any way concerned with
the welfare of the dog, such as local prohibitions on slaughtering animals in
multi-family dwellings or discharging firearms in particular places. I have an
obligation to provide food and water to the animals whom I keep on my farm,
but I may keep them in confined conditions and perform a number of
procedures on them that are very painful.
Sunstein also fails to appreciate the limiting principle that animates the legal
regulations that do exist. To the extent that the law applies (and many animal
uses are exempt from regulation) and recognizes that certain animal interests
must be protected, that protection is, for the most part, limited to ensuring that
the animal can be exploited for a particular purpose. In order for us to exploit
animals, we must provide some minimal protection for their interests so that
they can serve the purposes for which we are using them. The law allows me to
treat a dog that I use as a guard animal very badly, but I cannot (at least in
theory) starve her to death. I am legally obligated to provide a minimal level of
care to her, but not much more than is required to keep her alive so that she can
serve that purpose. If I do not provide minimal sustenance and veterinary care
to my cows and pigs, they will die prematurely and their corpses will not be
suited to be sold as meat. If I do not provide adequate food or water to a
laboratory animal, and the experiment does not call for starvation or
117. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 44.
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dehydration (as some do), then I have introduced a variable that may result in
invalid scientific data. Given that we allow researchers to conduct starvation
and dehydration experiments on nonhumans, a requirement that animals
exploited in laboratories receive food and water has nothing to do with
recognizing that animals have inherent value or that their interests have moral
significance. The standards of animal welfare are more concerned with
recognizing that if we want to exploit animals in particular ways we have no
choice but to provide at least some protection for their interests.
B. Animal Property and “Unnecessary” Suffering
Sunstein argues that the status of animals as property is not inconsistent
with a commitment to prevent “unnecessary” suffering and that we ought to
prohibit or ban “the most indefensible practices.” The problem is that Sunstein
does not—and, indeed, cannot—provide a coherent theory of what constitutes
“unnecessary” suffering and what is an “indefensible” practice. A central point
of my argument that Sunstein and other critics fail to address is that most of our
uses of animals cannot plausibly be described as “necessary” and that these uses
per se are, indeed, morally indefensible irrespective of whether we treat animals
118
“humanely.” We do not need to eat animals, wear animals, or use animals for
entertainment purposes, and our only defense of these uses is our pleasure,
119
amusement, and convenience. Any suffering that we impose on animals
incidental to these uses is “unnecessary” and “indefensible.”
Sunstein does not agree with my position that we should all adopt a vegan
lifestyle and stop eating or using all animal products. Rather, he argues that we
should not inflict more suffering than is necessary given the unnecessary uses of
animals. It is difficult to understand how this can mean anything more than that
we ought not to inflict gratuitous suffering on animals. But no one would
disagree with that position; indeed, generally this is all that is required under
animal-welfare laws. Sunstein appears to believe that the law presently gives
animals “rights” because it prohibits the infliction of “unnecessary” suffering

118. Robert Garner argues that the welfarist approach is
not trying to show that the use of animals is morally wrong regardless of the benefits to
humans. Rather, the movement is trying to show that most, if not all, of the cruel and harmful
techniques currently employed on animals are unnecessary in the sense that they do not
produce human benefits or that such benefits can be achieved in other ways.
Robert Garner, Animal Welfare: A Political Defense, 1 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 161, 167 (2006). Garner
claims that I accept this analysis, id., and that it is “somewhat ironic” that I do so given my criticism of
Garner’s defense of welfarism. GARNER, supra note 7, at 41 n.2. Garner fails to understand that my
discussion of necessity concerns animal use per se and not the treatment of animals, which, as Garner
correctly notes, is the focus of the welfarist approach. See FRANCIONE, supra note 2, at 1–49.
119. It may be argued that the use of nonhumans in experiments to find cures for serious human
illnesses is not trivial in the same way as our other uses of animals. Necessity claims are suspect in this
context as well, and I maintain that animal use cannot be justified morally even if it is necessary in some
sense. See Gary L. Francione, The Use of Nonhuman Animals in Biomedical Research: Necessity and
Justification, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 241 (2007).
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and requires “humane” treatment.120 A right to “humane” treatment and to be
free from “unnecessary” suffering is no “right” at all in that it prohibits only
those actions that do not benefit humans and would, in any event, not be
committed by rational property owners.121
To the extent that Sunstein wants to go beyond prohibiting gratuitous
suffering, which no one defends, it is difficult to understand how he can regard
suffering incidental to efficient exploitation as “unnecessary” or “indefensible.”
Indeed, animal exploiters routinely argue that the practices identified as
objectionable by welfarists actually do provide a sufficient level of animal
welfare. For example, the National Pork Producers Council maintains that
although a number of different production systems are used in the pork
industry, intensive confinement systems, such as gestation crates, are actually
beneficial to the pigs and that producers would not use them if they were not
consistent with the welfare of the animals: “Producers’ livelihoods depend on
the well being and performance of their livestock. To do anything short of
providing the best, humane care possible would be self-defeating.”122 Those
involved in the ranch-raising of animals used to make fur coats claim that if the
animals were not properly cared for they would not produce top-quality fur.123
Indeed, animal exploiters claim that these sorts of performance measures are
the only, or at least the primary, way of measuring welfare in an objective and
non-anthropomorphic manner. If all that Sunstein is saying is that forms of
exploitation that are not efficient should be replaced by more efficient forms of
exploitation, then he is merely promoting the traditional welfarist position that

120. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights of Animals, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 389–90 (2003). Sunstein
argues that the primary problem is a lack of standing to enforce these “rights.” Id. at 391–92.
121. British lawyer Mike Radford maintains that, at least as far as English and Scottish law are
concerned, I am wrong to maintain that when human and nonhuman interests are balanced, the animal
loses whenever the human has a commercial interest. See RADFORD, supra note 7, at 249. According to
Radford, Ford v. Wiley, 23 Q.B.D. 203 (1889), a case in which a British court held that dehorning older
cattle with saws violated the anticruelty law because it caused unnecessary suffering, establishes the
application of a two-stage process to determine necessity. “First, it must be shown that the animal’s
treatment was to effect an ‘adequate and reasonable object’; secondly, ‘There must be proportion
between the object and the means’.” RADFORD, supra note 7, at 248 (quoting 23 Q.B.D. at 210, 215). A
closer examination of Ford v. Wiley, including other painful procedures discussed approvingly by the
court, such as castration of animals and the severity used in the breaking of horses, provides a context
for the meaning of the test that Radford regards as refuting my notion about the general interpretation
of necessity. Moreover, Ford v. Wiley actually reinforces my view that suffering for economic reasons is
generally considered as necessary as long as the practice in question is commonly accepted by those
involved in animal agriculture. The opinions of both Lord Chief Justice Coleridge and Justice Hawkins
noted that the practice of the dehorning older cattle had been discontinued in England, Wales, and
most of Scotland, and was no longer an accepted agricultural practice. For a further discussion of Ford
v. Wiley and subsequent British case law holding that if an agricultural practice is commonly accepted
there is no violation of the anticruelty law even if there are less painful alternatives, see FRANCIONE,
supra note 2, at 61–62.
122. National Pork Producers Council, Gestation Stalls: The Facts, http://www.nppc.org/public_
policy/gestation_stalls.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2007). Some welfarists argue that gestation crates are
not as economically beneficial as alternative production systems. See supra notes 56 and 65 and
accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., FUR COMMISSION USA, FUR FACTS 5 (2005), available at http://www.fur
commission.com/resource/Resources/FAF.pdf.
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treats animals as nothing more than commodities with only extrinsic value, and
again, no animal exploiter would disagree with him.
Sunstein may be claiming that certain practices are unnecessary for the
production of animal products under a different system. He may, for instance,
be saying that intensive confinement would not be necessary if we were to raise
animals on family farms, which, of course, would cause the price of animal
products to rise dramatically. Such an alternative form of animal agriculture
may very well improve animal welfare, but animals would still suffer a great
deal and that suffering would be no more defensible or necessary given that it is
not necessary to eat animal products at all. Once we acknowledge that most of
our uses of nonhumans—however “humane” we may treat those involved—are
not necessary in any meaningful sense of that term, then the notion that we
ought to prohibit “unnecessary” suffering becomes unprincipled and reflective
only of subjective and often elitist preferences.
C. Animal Property and Inherent Value
Sunstein agrees that “sentient animals have intrinsic value, and that animal
well-being is a good in itself,”124 but he maintains that it is possible to recognize
that intrinsic value even if animals remain the property of humans. Although we
certainly could treat animals better even if they remain our property, Sunstein
fails to recognize the limitations that exist as the result of our regarding them as
our property, as things that we own. Property has only extrinsic or conditional
value. When we say that a person has inherent or intrinsic value, what we mean
is that she has value that is not solely extrinsic and conditional. We recognize
that she has value because she values herself, even if no one else values her. We
may use other humans as means to our ends, but we cannot use them
exclusively as means to our ends.125
As a legal matter, we do not regard animals as having any value apart from
the value we accord them. For the most part, that valuation is tied to their status
124. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 45. Owners of companion animals may regard those animals as
having more than market value, and one might say that the owner regards the animal as having
“intrinsic” or “inherent” value. That sense of intrinsic value, which concerns sentimental or
idiosyncratic valuation by particular animal owners, is, however, different from the notion of moral
value that Sunstein uses when he talks about intrinsic value.
125. See FRANCIONE, supra note 2, at 90–98. Sunstein maintains that “[i]n many domains human
beings seem to be ‘used,’ and the relevant practices are not objectionable for that reason.” Sunstein,
supra note 7, at 45. He argues that “[w]hen you hire a plumber, a lawyer, an architect, or someone to
clean your house, you are treating them as means, not as ends.” Id. Although it is true that we use
others as means to our ends, we are not allowed to treat them exclusively as means to ends. We can, for
instance, value our plumber as a means to the end of repairing a leak. But if we do not think that the
plumber is competent, we are not allowed to treat her solely as an economic commodity all of whose
interests may be ignored if it benefits us to do so. We cannot enslave the incompetent plumber in a
forced-labor camp; we cannot use her as a nonconsenting subject in a biomedical experiment or as an
unwilling organ donor. Even if we do not value the plumber as a plumber, she still has residual value
that prevents us from valuing her fundamental interests at zero. In the book that Sunstein was
reviewing in the context of making these comments, I use the plumber example and distinguish
between treating the plumber as a means to an end and treating her exclusively as a means to an end.
See FRANCIONE, supra note 2, at 90–91.
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as property. We treat animals exclusively as means to our ends. Sunstein may be
correct that we can do a better job of taking animal interests seriously, but that
is much easier said than done. Consider the situation of human slavery in North
America.126 This institution was structurally identical to the institution of animal
ownership. The slave was regarded as property, and the slave owner was able to
disregard almost all of the slave’s interests if it was economically beneficial to
do so. The law generally deferred to the slave owner’s judgment as to the value
of the slave. There was no meaningful balancing of interests, as the owner’s
property interest in the slave almost always trumped any interest of the slave
who was ostensibly protected under the law. Slave-welfare laws failed to
establish any meaningful limit on the use of slaves, just as animal-welfare laws
fail to establish any meaningful limit on our use of nonhumans. There are
powerful economic, legal, political, and social forces that militate against
treating property as anything other than property. We should, of course,
provide as much animal welfare as can be economically justified; for instance,
we ought to substitute group housing for the gestation crate if that, in fact,
reduces production costs and increases productivity. But this use of “ought” is
related to economic rationality and not to any recognition of the inherent value
of animals.
Sunstein claims that “the language of property does not necessarily signify
that animals will be treated as means.”127 It is not clear what Sunstein means by
distinguishing between the language of property discourse and the fact of
property status. In any event, we talk about animals as property because
animals are property. To the extent that Sunstein is suggesting that animal
welfare is consistent with recognizing that animals have inherent value, I do not
think that Sunstein appreciates that welfarist measures rarely, if ever, require
that we protect animal interests in the absence of an identifiable—usually
economic—human benefit, and even when they do, they are not related to
inherent value. Sunstein frequently uses the example of dogs and cats—the
nonhumans who most often serve as companions of humans—as beings to
whom we can and do accord inherent value despite their property status.
Certainly, many of us regard our nonhuman companions as having inherent
value. But those of us who do so do not really regard our nonhumans primarily
as our property or as anything remotely similar to our televisions, cars or the
like. Indeed, we regard those nonhumans as members of our families. As far as
the law is concerned, however, companion animals have no inherent value
except in an idiosyncratic sense.128 The law protects the ability of property
owners to treat property as if it had inherent value.

126. See ALAN WATSON, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAS (1989); FRANCIONE, supra note 2, at 86–
90.
127. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 44.
128. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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D. Animal Property and Equal Consideration
Finally, the property status of animals effectively and as a very practical
matter precludes our giving serious consideration to their interests, even though
it certainly is possible, at least in theory, to do better than we presently do. It is,
however, not possible to accord nonhuman animals equal consideration if they
129
are the property of humans. Although we do not and cannot protect humans
from all suffering, the laws of virtually every nation and customary international
law recognize that all humans have the right not to be chattel and not to suffer
at all from their use exclusively as resources of others—however “humane” that
use may be. It is not possible to accord equal consideration to animal interests if
animals are property because their very status as property means that they will
be used in ways that we would regard as inappropriate to use any humans.
I have argued elsewhere that there is a compelling argument that utilitarian
philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) rejected human slavery not only
because he thought that slavery had social disutility, but because he recognized
that the interests of slaves would never count for as much as the similar interests
130
of slave owners. Therefore, even though Bentham rejected moral rights as a
general matter, it is certainly arguable that he recognized that every human had
to have at least a right not to be the property of others in order to be a member
of the moral community in the first place. Bentham and others who have sought
to apply the principle of equal consideration to nonhuman property have erred
in not recognizing that the same analysis applies to animals. The principle of
equal consideration cannot be applied meaningfully to animals who are
property any more than it can be applied to humans who are property.131 In
short, the equal consideration of animal interests necessarily requires the
recognition that nonhumans have a right not to be treated as the property of
humans.

129. See FRANCIONE, supra note 2, at 81–102.; see also Francione, supra note 116, at 239–45
(discussing equal consideration, property status, and the interests of animals in continued existence).
130. See FRANCIONE, supra note 2, at 130–50. Bentham, who is regarded as an act-utilitarian (one
for whom the right act is that which maximizes net welfare in the particular situation) was, at the very
least, a rule-utilitarian (one for whom the right act is that which, when followed as a general matter, will
maximize net welfare even if it does not do so in the particular situation) when it came to slavery in that
he rejected the morality of slavery as an institution.
131. See id. Both Bentham and Peter Singer seek to apply the principle of equal consideration to
animal interests. Although both reject human slavery, neither rejects the property status of animals, in
part because both believe that animals do not have an interest in their lives and only have an interest in
not suffering. As a result, neither sees a problem per se with using animals for human purposes. I argue
that sentience implies an interest in continued life and that Bentham and Singer err by linking an
interest in life with reflective self-awareness or humanlike self-consciousness. The view that animals do
not have an interest in continued existence also appears to be the basis of Sunstein’s position that
animal use per se does not raise a serious moral issue. See Francione, supra note 116.
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IV
NEW WELFARISM: A FALSE DILEMMA AND AN INCORRECT ASSUMPTION
Many animal advocates recognize that the property status of animals is
problematic, and they claim to seek, as a long-term objective at least, the
modification of the legal status of animals and perhaps even the eradication of
property status and the abolition of animal exploitation. Nevertheless, these
advocates, to whom I refer as “new welfarists,”132 maintain that at this time we
do not really have a choice. We must pursue welfarist change or do nothing.
They maintain that the abolition of exploitation is “idealistic” or “utopian”
because it cannot be achieved immediately and that animal-welfare reform is
the only way to reduce the suffering of animals now. Moreover, many claim that
incremental welfarist change will eventually bring about the abolition of animal
exploitation. Both tenets of new welfarism are wrong.
A. The Rights Position Provides Normative Guidance
First, new welfarism establishes a false dilemma: pursue traditional animal
welfare or do nothing to help nonhumans who are suffering now. The dilemma
is false because, in addition to the general failure of traditional animal welfare
to alleviate animal suffering, the rights position does provide meaningful
normative guidance and is not “idealistic” or “utopian.” Although the rights
133
position is often misrepresented, it does not maintain that there is any
possibility of the immediate abolition of all institutionalized exploitation or
134
reject incremental change as a means of achieving abolition. Rather, the rights
position seeks change that incrementally eradicates the property status of
nonhumans and recognizes that nonhumans have inherent value.

132. See generally FRANCIONE, supra note 3 (discussing the phenomenon of “new welfarism” or the
view that animal rights offers no normative guidance in the short-term and animal-welfare regulation
will lead to the abolition of exploitation, or to some significant recognition of the inherent value of
nonhumans, in the long term). All of my critics promote a version of new welfarism. See supra note 7.
Modern “animal law” is also based on new welfarism and assumes that the alternative to traditional
welfare is to forsake the welfare of animals now and that welfare regulation will lead to the recognition
of the inherent value of nonhumans. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
133. For example, Robert Garner incorrectly states that my position is “that reforms to the
treatment of animals short of abolition are not worth having.” GARNER, supra note 7, at 221.
134. See, e.g., Favre, supra note 7, at 90. Favre, commenting on what he understands to be my
position, states that those who criticize welfarist incremental change “possess an incorrect
understanding of property law” and that “[i]t is highly unlikely that the elimination of property status
will occur in the foreseeable future.” Favre misses the point on a number of levels. No one maintains
that property status is going to be eliminated anytime soon. The point is whether we should pursue its
elimination incrementally through regulations that diminish property rights in nonhumans rather than
pursue welfarist regulations that, for the most part, merely reinforce the property paradigm. For a
discussion of this issue, see FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 160–62. For a discussion about how
incremental change as steps toward an identifiable goal has worked in another context (the victims’
rights movement), and why the incremental approach that I propose is preferable to the approach
urged by others to seek change in the status of nonhumans through common-law adjudication, see
Douglas E. Beloof, Crime Victims’ Rights: Critical Concepts for Animal Rights, 7 ANIMAL L. 19, 25–29
(2001).
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The rights position provides definite normative guidance for incremental
change on an individual level, as well as on the level of social and legal
135
change. On the individual level, rights theory prescribes incremental change in
the form of veganism.136 Veganism is not merely a matter of diet; it is a moral
and political commitment to abolition on the individual level and extends not
only to matters of food, but to clothing and other products. Many animal
advocates claim to favor animal rights and to want to abolish animal
exploitation but continue to eat animal products. That is no different from
someone who claims to be in favor of the abolition of slavery but who continues
to own slaves. Moreover, there is no meaningful distinction between eating
meat and eating dairy or other animal products. Nonhumans exploited in the
dairy industry live longer than those used for meat, but they are treated worse
during that life, and they end up in the same slaughterhouse after which we
consume their flesh anyway. There is probably more suffering in a glass of milk
or an ice cream cone than there is in a steak.
Some animal advocates claim that veganism is a matter of personal
philosophy and should not be identified as a baseline principle of the rights
movement. But that claim is incoherent. It is not necessary in any sense to eat
meat or dairy products. If the animal-rights movement cannot take a principled
position on an activity that results in the suffering and death of billions of
animals for no reason other than that we enjoy the taste of meat and dairy, then
the movement can take no principled stand on any institutional exploitation.
Rather than embrace veganism as a clear moral baseline, the animaladvocacy movement has instead adopted the notion that we can “consume with
conscience.” For example, Peter Singer maintains that we can be “conscientious
omnivores” and exploit animals ethically if, for example, we choose to eat only
137
animals who have been well-cared-for and then killed without pain or distress.
Singer praises purveyors of “humanely” exploited animal products, such as
Whole Foods Markets, Inc. and its CEO, John Mackey, as “ethically
responsible.”138 Animal advocate Tom Regan featured Mackey as a keynote
speaker for a 2005 conference entitled “The Power of One,”139 which focused on
the ability of individuals to make meaningful changes for nonhumans. PETA
gave Whole Foods an award in 2004, claiming that the company “has

135. See FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 147–219. Indeed, it is the welfarist position, which maintains
that we ought to pursue any measure that reduces suffering, that fails to provide normative guidance
because almost any measure can be said to reduce suffering. See id. at 156–62.
136. See, e.g., id. at 152.
137. PETER SINGER & JIM MASON, THE WAY WE EAT: WHY OUR FOOD CHOICES MATTER 81–
183 (2006).
138. See id. at 177–83.
139. See Promotional Brochure from The Culture and Animals Foundation and The Institute for
Animals and Society, The Power of One: The Twentieth Annual International Compassionate Living
Festival, available at http://www.animalsandsociety.org/documents/PowerofOnebrochure.pdf (last
visited Mar. 19, 2007). Regan is the author of THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (1983).
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consistently done more for animal welfare than any retailer in the industry,
140
requiring that its producers adhere to strict standards.”
Putting aside whether these supposedly “strict standards” make any real
141
difference to the nonhumans involved, it is, as a general matter, always better
to do less harm than more once we have decided to inflict harm. But the notion
that the animal movement actively promotes doing less harm as a morally
acceptable solution to the problem of animal exploitation is troubling. That is, if
X is going to rape Y, it is “better” that X not beat Y as well. It would, however,
be morally repugnant to maintain that we can be “conscientious rapists” by
ensuring that we not beat rape victims. Similarly, it is disturbing that animal
advocates are promoting the notion that we can be morally “conscientious
omnivores” if we eat the supposedly “humanely” produced products of Whole
Foods and other purveyors. Not only is such a position in conflict with the
notion that animal lives have moral significance, but it strongly encourages
those concerned about nonhumans to see continued consumption as a morally
acceptable alternative to adopting a vegan lifestyle.
In any event, any claim to embrace the rights or abolitionist position without
accepting that veganism is the only morally consistent way to take immediate
action to make that happen at least in one’s own life makes no sense. Veganism
represents a rejection of the commodity status of nonhumans and a recognition
of their inherent value.
On the social and legal level, there needs to be a paradigm shift as a social
matter before the legal system will respond in a meaningful way. I disagree with
those who maintain that the legal system will lead in the struggle for animal
rights or that significant legal change will occur in the absence of the
development of a political and social movement in support of animal rights and
142
the abolition of animal exploitation.
The most important form of incremental change on a social level is
education about veganism and the need to abolish, not merely to regulate, the
143
institutionalized exploitation of animals. The animal-advocacy movement in

140. PETA,
2004
PETA
Progress
Awards,
http://www.peta.org/feat/proggy/2004/
winners.html#retailer (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
141. Professor Ibrahim maintains that the “strict standards” of Whole Foods do not provide much
protection for animals. See Darian M. Ibrahim, A Return to Descartes: Property, Profit, and the
Corporate Ownership of Animals, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 109–11 (Winter 2007).
142. See, e.g., STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS
(2000).
143. See, e.g., FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 177–89. I am bewildered by those critics who claim that I
emphasize the importance of legislation over non-legal social changes, such as education and the
activities of grassroots activists. See, e.g., Matthew Pamental, Pragmatism and Pets: Best Friends Animal
sm
Sanctuary, Maddie’s Fund , and No More Homeless Pets in Utah, in ANIMAL PRAGMATISM:
RETHINKING HUMAN-NONHUMAN RELATIONSHIPS 210, 211 (Erin McKenna & Andrew Light eds.,
2004) (“[B]y focusing solely on animal rights legislation Francione overlooks two crucial components in
any reconstruction of social conditions: community support and education. He therefore ignores the
successes of local, grassroots, volunteer activities in improving the treatment of animals.”). In addition
to being critical of legislation and emphasizing education as the primary means of social change, I have
also emphasized the importance of grassroots activities. See, e.g., FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 71–74.
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the United States has seriously failed to educate the public about the need for
the abolition of animal exploitation. Although there are many reasons for this
failure, a primary one is that animal-advocacy groups find it easier to promote
welfarist campaigns aimed at reducing “unnecessary” suffering that have little
practical effect and are often endorsed by the industry involved. Such
campaigns are easy for advocates to package and sell and they do not offend
anyone. It is easier to tell people that they can be morally “conscientious
omnivores” than it is to take the position that veganism is a moral baseline.
That, however, is precisely the problem. No one disagrees with the principle
that it is wrong to inflict “unnecessary” suffering and that we ought to treat
animals “humanely.” But, as 200 years of animal welfare have made plain, these
are merely platitudes in light of the property status of animals.
To the extent that national organizations promote abolition, they do so
simultaneously with promoting welfarist campaigns, and the result is a
confusing message that provides no clear direction for social change. For
example, PETA claims to promote the abolition of animal exploitation while
giving awards to various animal exploiters, such as Temple Grandin and Whole
Foods, Inc. On one hand, PETA claims to support veganism; on the other hand,
it encourages the notion that “humane” animal exploitation is morally
acceptable and praiseworthy.
Veganism and abolitionist education provide practical and incremental
strategies both in terms of reducing animal suffering now and in terms of
building a movement in the future that will be able to obtain legislation more
meaningful than regulations (mischaracterized as “bans”) on the use of
gestation crates in states that do not even have producers who use gestation
crates, or the establishment of “sanctuaries” where “retired” animals can be
used for experiments if there is a “public health need.” If, in the late 1980s—
when the animal-advocacy community in the United States decided very
deliberately to pursue a welfarist agenda—a substantial portion of movement
resources had been invested in vegan and abolitionist education, there would
likely be hundreds of thousands more vegans than there are today. This is a
very conservative estimate given the hundreds of millions of dollars that have
been expended by animal-advocacy groups to promote welfarist legislation and
initiatives. I maintain that having the increased number of vegans would reduce
suffering more by decreasing demand for animal products than all of the
144
welfarist “successes” put together and multiplied ten-fold. Increasing the
number of vegans would also help to build a political and economic base
required for the social change that is a necessary predicate for significant legal

144. An average omnivore in the United States is responsible for at least thirty-two nonhuman
deaths per year. This number is based on an estimate of 9.5 billion animals killed in the United States
and consumed by a population of 300 million. The number of animals killed does not include fish or
other sea animals, and only reflects animal use for food and not for other purposes.
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change.145 Given limited time and limited financial resources, it is not clear how
anyone who seeks abolition as a long-term goal, or who at least accepts that the
property status of animals is a most serious impediment to any significant
change and must at least be radically modified, could believe that expansion of
traditional animal welfare is a rational and efficient choice, putting aside any
considerations about inconsistencies in moral theory.
There are “compelling reasons for animal rights advocates to spend their
limited time and resources on incremental changes achieved through various
forms of education, protest, and boycotts,” rather than legislative or
146
administrative regulation. The primary reason is that regulation cannot
succeed unless it has at least the tacit support of institutional animal exploiters.
The price of this support is compromise that generally eviscerates the regulation
and limits it to measures that make exploitation more economically beneficial
to exploiters.147 This is why education and social change are so important and
must precede legal change. There is simply no political base to support any
radical legal change at this time. Although many people have vague sympathies
toward animals, most eat animals and there is no abolitionist movement to
support measures that would challenge the property status of animals in any
serious way. Indeed, the leaders of the animal-advocacy movement actively
encourage the public to believe that being a “conscientious omnivore” is
morally acceptable.
If, despite these cautions, which have become more pronounced in my mind
in the past dozen years, animal advocates nevertheless want to pursue change
through legislation, administrative regulation, or litigation, those campaigns
ought to be explicitly targeted at eradicating the property status of animals in an
incremental way. On the one hand, no single incremental measure will succeed
in achieving equal consideration for nonhumans because equal consideration is
not possible as long as animals are property. On the other hand, most welfarist
measures do nothing but require that animal exploiters act in a more rational
way and do a more efficient job exploiting their animal property.
The problem is that it is tempting for animal advocates who need successful
campaigns for fundraising purposes to portray any measure that protects an
animal interest and that is arguably not required to be protected for economic
reasons as a meaningful step away from property status. For example, a

145. Robert Garner defends the welfarist strategy because he views it as earning the respect of
decisionmakers and making possible short-term improvements, although he admits they often do not
amount to much. GARNER, supra note 7, at 220–30. Garner apparently believes that minimal change is
all we can expect given the lack of public support for more. But he concedes defeat on the root cause of
the problem—the lack of public support for more significant change—and instead focuses on masking
its symptoms. Garner discusses the importance of unification of the movement but fails to consider that
if animal advocates were to unify behind the abolitionist position, and not the welfarist position, this
might lead to the formation of a political movement that would be able to obtain more significant
change.
146. See FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 163.
147. See William A. Reppy, Jr., Broad Exemptions in Animal-Cruelty Statutes Unconstitutionally
Deny Equal Protection of the Law, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 255, 256–60 (Winter 2007).
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proposal not based on meat quality or similar concerns to give battery hens
additional cage space may be regarded as not treating the hen exclusively as
property. But such a measure obviously does little, if anything, to relieve
suffering and any good that such a measure does is probably more than offset
by the public perception that animal use has been made more “humane” and is,
therefore, more acceptable. Moreover, such a measure does nothing to
eradicate property status in the long term in any meaningful sense and may
even reinforce that status.
In order for incremental change to be a step in the direction of abolition
rather than marching in place within the property paradigm, it is necessary to
identify measures that explicitly and progressively recognize that nonhumans
have more than extrinsic or conditional value alone. Since no one incremental
step will achieve abolition, identifying criteria for incremental steps in
diminishing the property status of nonhumans will necessarily be imprecise. In
Rain Without Thunder, I recognized this necessary lack of precision and I
presented my preliminary thoughts on five conjunctive criteria that might be
used to identify incremental measures that would necessarily fall short of
abolishing the property status of nonhumans but that would nevertheless
148
represent significant steps away from property status. The idea was to identify
regulations that, although not abolishing property status altogether, went well
beyond the efficient exploitation of traditional welfare and rejected the status of
animals as commodities through the explicit recognition that nonhumans have
inherent value and interests that must be protected irrespective of economic
consequences. Given that these incremental measures do not abolish property
status, their primary value is as stepping stones on the path toward abolition.
Incremental measures cannot lead to more incremental measures without
reflecting a progressive recognition of the inherent value of animals.
Briefly summarized, these criteria involve prohibitions149 of significant
institutional activities,150 as opposed to traditional welfarist regulation requiring
“humane” treatment or relatively minor prohibitions. For example, a
prohibition on the use of any leghold trap is to be preferred over a requirement
that any trapping be done “humanely,” or with the use of a “padded” leghold
trap. A prohibition on the use of any animals in a particular type of experiment
is to be preferred over a requirement of an animal-care committee to monitor

148. See FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 190–219. Critics who claim that I propose no incremental
legal change have apparently overlooked this aspect of my work. See, e.g., Andrew Light & Erin
McKenna, Introduction: Pragmatism and the Future of Human-Nonhuman Relationships, in ANIMAL
PRAGMATISM, supra note 143, at 7–8. I accept, however, that this portion of Rain Without Thunder,
which I presented explicitly as a preliminary analysis, was not as clear as it could have been and I plan
to clarify my views on incremental regulatory change in future writing.
149. See FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 192–96 (“Criterion 1: An Incremental Change Must
Constitute a Prohibition”).
150. See id. at 196–98 (“Criterion 2: The Prohibited Activity Must Be Constitutive of the
Exploitative Institution”).
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the treatment of animals used in experiments. A prohibition on the production
of any veal is to be preferred to promoting non-crated veal.
Moreover, the incremental change must protect interests beyond those
necessary in order to exploit the animal in an efficient way (the limiting
151
principle of most animal welfare) and should be explicitly promoted as
recognizing that nonhumans have interests that are not tradable or able to be
152
ignored merely because humans will benefit from doing so. These criteria
together involve the recognition that animals have interests apart from those
necessary to protect in order to exploit them, and value that is not exclusively
extrinsic or conditional. Finally, animal advocates should never be in a position
of promoting an alternative, more “humane” or “better” form of exploitation,
or substituting one species for another. Any incremental legislative or
regulatory measure ought to be accompanied by an unrelenting and clear call
for the abolition of all institutionalized exploitation.153
An example of a measure satisfying these conjunctive criteria would be a
prohibition on the use of animals for a particular sort of experiment, such as a
ban on the use of all animals in psychological experiments, based on the
recognition that animals have morally significant interests in not being used for
such experiments irrespective of human benefits. A ban on the use of one
species of animal might be acceptable if it were not based on any supposed
moral superiority of that particular species and if no other species were
proposed as an alternative. Any ban should be presented explicitly as part of an
agenda that rejects all vivisection.
A prohibition that satisfied all these criteria would not have any significant
chance of succeeding at the present time, but the process of promoting such a
prohibition would at least have the effect of educating the legal and political
system, as well as society in general, about the need for radical change.154 In any
event, advocates are better advised to put their time and resources into
incremental change through vegan and abolitionist education and to engage in
hands-on work involving the care of individual animals. Advocates should avoid
campaigns that seek incremental change through legislation or regulation, for
any measure that might help to eradicate the property status of animals cannot
succeed as a practical matter and any campaign that can succeed will, in all
likelihood, merely reinforce the property status of animals. Advocates should
also avoid campaigns that seek to get industry to make voluntary changes as
these efforts are usually futile at best and are often counterproductive.

151. See id. at 199–203 (“Criterion 3: The Prohibition Must Recognize and Respect a
Noninstitutional Animal Interest”).
152. See id. at 203–07 (“Criterion 4: Animal interests Cannot Be Tradable”).
153. See id. at 207–11 (“Criterion 5: The Prohibition Shall Not Substitute an Alternative, and
Supposedly More ‘Humane,’ Form of Exploitation”).
154. See, e.g., id. at 187. Given that traditional welfarist regulation does little if anything to help
animals and merely reinforces the property paradigm, such regulation does not even provide a useful
educational vehicle for more sustained change.
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B. Welfare and Abolition
Second, new welfarism maintains that traditional incremental changes in
animal welfare will eventually lead to abolition or to a significant change in the
property status of animals, and it is neither necessary nor desirable to have a
strategy focused explicitly on veganism and eradication of that property status.
There is, however, absolutely no historical evidence for the position that
welfarist regulation today will lead to abolition or to greater protection
tomorrow. Indeed, the empirical evidence shows that the opposite is true.
Animal welfare seems to lead only to continued and increased use.
The CHIMP Act is a good example of how animal welfare facilitates animal
155
exploitation. Those sponsoring the legislation recognized the view shared by
many that research involving chimpanzees was morally problematic and that, if
the public were to be expected to continue to support such research, it would be
necessary to create a more “humane” environment for the chimpanzees. It must
be remembered that the most significant form of animal exploitation in
history—intensive agriculture—developed during the latter part of the
twentieth century, when concern about animal welfare was at a high point.
Moreover, recent supposed reform of some aspects of intensive agriculture is
not leading toward veganism. If anything, it is encouraging the notion that
animal consumption can be a morally acceptable if we are “conscientious
omnivores” and eat animals who have been raised more “humanely.”
In any event, we have had animal welfare in most western nations for the
better part of 200 years, and we are inflicting pain, suffering, and death on more
nonhumans today than at any time in human history. There is no empirical
reason to believe that animal welfare will lead to abolition or to any significant
change in the property status of nonhumans.
V
THE EMERGENCE OF “ANIMAL LAW”
In the past decade, a significant number of American law schools have
begun to offer courses on “animal law.”156 There is also a growing body of legal
157
scholarship focused on animals. These developments, together with an
155. See supra notes 26–52 and accompanying text. An interesting example of the false dilemma of
welfarist change or no change is illustrated in this context by one animal advocate who criticizes those
who did not support the CHIMP Act. See Favre, supra note 7, at 90. Favre claims that the CHIMP Act
“provided positive alternatives for many chimpanzees” and animal advocates should support such laws
as a “next step . . . because otherwise next steps will not happen.” Id. Favre assumes not only that the
choice is between the CHIMP Act or nothing but also that the CHIMP Act is itself a desirable piece of
legislation.
156. For the most part, these courses are taught by adjunct instructors, not full-time faculty
members.
157. Much of the increase in scholarship is as the result of Animal Law, a journal that was begun by
the Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) and existed as an independent journal housed at the Lewis
and Clark Law School. The journal is now an official publication of Lewis and Clark. Given the origin
of Animal Law, many of the authors of articles in Animal Law have been officers, directors, or
employees of ALDF. It remains to be seen whether Animal Law will continue to focus on ALDF
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increase in the number of practicing attorneys concerned with issues involving
animals, have led the media to conclude that “[a]nimal law is a specialty whose
158
time has come” and that “animal rights law has begun to blossom into a viable
career path for a new generation of attorneys.”159
Although there can be no doubt that animal issues have become more
prominent both in the legal academy and in law practice, it is important to
understand that, for the most part, what is meant by “animal law” has little to
do with animal rights and abolition and very much embraces the false
dichotomy that we can choose either to pursue traditional animal-welfare
measures or we can “sacrifice the welfare of existing animals.”160 Modern animal
law, for the most part, promotes traditional welfarist change as a way of
modifying the property status of animals. “Pet custody, wrongful death cases,
veterinary malpractice suits, pet cruelty cases, and even pet trusts in which
people set aside money in their wills to care for their companion animals are
slowly reaching a critical mass in lower courts.”161 Animal advocates claim that
these cases are “laying the legal foundation establishing that pets have intrinsic
worth” that will serve eventually to “support a ruling that animals are not
property but have rights of their own and thus legal standing.”162
These sorts of cases and legal issues may, indeed, provide career
opportunities for lawyers, but they will also reinforce the property paradigm
rather than challenge it. For example, because nonhumans are property, the fair
market value of an animal or the actual economic value of the animal to the
owner are the predominant measures of damages used when one person
tortiously injures or kills an animal belonging to another.163 This has effectively
prevented owners from obtaining redress for injury to their animals because
many companion animals do not have a significant market or actual economic
value.
The traditional approach is being changed by case law and statute in some
states in favor of recognizing the emotional bond between humans and their
animal property, and this is claimed by some animal advocates to be a
164
significant step in the direction of eroding the property status of animals. Such
authors and practitioner-oriented articles. There are, however, other publications starting to appear.
For example, students at the University of Pennsylvania Law School launched an annual publication in
2006, the Journal of Animal Law and Ethics, which purports to be a more traditional law review with an
interdisciplinary focus. In addition, there is the Journal of Animal Law, produced by David Favre.
158. Zay N. Smith, She’s Raising Bar in Fight for Animal Rights, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 18, 2004, at
24.
159. Douglas Belkin, Animal Rights Gains Foothold as Law Career Harvard Hosts Court
Competition for 50 Students, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 2005, at 6.
160. Favre, supra note 7, at 90.
161. Belkin, supra note 159. These traditional welfarist topics are the primary focus of the casebook
used in a number of courses. See SONIA S. WAISMAN, BRUCE A. WAGMAN, & PAMELA D. FRASCH,
ANIMAL LAW (3d ed. 2006).
162. Belkin, supra note 159.
163. See, e.g., Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. Schuster, 144 S.W.3d 554, 560 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004)
(limiting recovery to economic value of the animal).
164. See Belkin, supra note 159.
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a claim, however, is not justified. Courts have long recognized that there can be
instances in which fair-market value is an inadequate measure of damages for
property that does not have a market value, such as photographs and heirlooms,
and they have allowed alternative measures.165 That some courts are analogizing
dogs to heirlooms and photographs that lack market value is, of course, a good
thing for the owners of animals just as it is a good thing for owners of otherwise
worthless heirlooms and photographs. It does not, however, amount to
change—or a step toward a change—in the legal status of the animal any more
than it means that heirlooms and photographs are regarded less as property
because courts have recognized that fair-market value may not be an adequate
measure of damages in a particular case.
Even if animal advocates persuade courts or legislatures to accept that
nonhuman companions injured or killed by another are “special property” and
similar to heirlooms, or permit damages for loss of companionship or emotional
distress, that is not going to change the legal status of the nonhumans as
property or represent a recognition that the animal has inherent or intrinsic
worth. It will recognize only that some people value their animal property more
than do others and that, in certain instances, the law will respect that valuation
and not limit the property owner to a measure of damages that does not
compensate the loss suffered.
Moreover, looking to the emotional reaction of an owner to determine the
value of a nonhuman may have anomalous results. In Fredeen v. Stride, the
owner took her injured dog, who had been shot in the right hind leg, to a
veterinarian and decided to have the dog euthanized because she could not
166
afford the cost of treatment. The veterinarian agreed to do so but instead
nursed the animal back to health, and the dog was ultimately placed in another
home. The owner saw the dog six months later and claimed to suffer mental
anguish because she feared that her children would encounter the dog and
attempt to reunite with him. She sued the veterinarian and was awarded $500
for conversion, $4000 for mental anguish, and $700 in punitive damages, and the
Oregon Supreme Court affirmed. Fredeen involves one of the largest awards for
the emotional distress suffered by a human in connection with the treatment of
her nonhuman companion, and the damages were awarded because the human
was deprived of the death of her dog.167

165. See, e.g., Jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hosp., Ltd., 510 N.E.2d 1084 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). For a
discussion of the inadequacy of the fair-market measure of damages, see FRANCIONE, supra note 1, at
57–63.
166. 525 P.2d 166 (Or. 1974).
167. An increase in litigation against veterinarians will most likely cause malpractice insurance to
become more expensive and this will result in higher costs being charged for veterinary services.
Although health insurance is available for companion animals, it is limited, often does not apply to
older animals, and is costly. In any event, increased veterinary costs will invariably result in less
veterinary care for some nonhumans.
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Similarly, that some states now permit trusts for pets168 is not likely to lead to
a change in the legal status of animals or to the recognition that nonhumans
have inherent value as a general matter. It is certainly desirable to allow the
owners of animals to provide for their animals after their deaths, but again, all
this amounts to as a legal matter is a recognition that property owners should be
able to decide how to devise and bequeath their property as they see fit,
including to benefit other property that they own. In many respects, allowing
pet owners to establish trusts for their pets is no different from allowing them to
establish trusts to maintain a historical building that they own. Pet trusts cannot
credibly be characterized as “a conceptual breakthrough for the United States
legal system” on the theory that “[a]nimals have been granted legal personhood
for purposes of trust enforcement” and that for probate and trust purposes
“animals are juristic persons with equal rights before the court.”169
Some animal advocates claim that cases involving the custody of animals
indicate that “[c]ourts across the country have begun to adopt the more
enlightened view that companion animals are more than mere chattels”170 or
that these cases represent “‘one way of taking down the wall’”171 between
humans and nonhumans. Again, such a claim is unfounded, although it is clear
that at least some animal lawyers are developing lucrative practices with these
sorts of cases.172 When couples separate, they often have disputes about all sorts
of property, including nonhuman animals. That a court enforces a custody
agreement involving a nonhuman is no different from the court enforcing an
agreement about the shared use of a car. Although some courts may have
focused on the “best interest” of the nonhuman involved in a custody matter,
this is not an indication of any shift—even an attenuated or indirect one—in the
property status of nonhumans. The animals involved are still chattels.173
Moreover, the law has through anticruelty laws explicitly recognized for the
better part of 200 years that animals have interests in the way that inanimate
property does not. The problem is that this recognition has had no significant

168. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-2907(B) (2006).
169. Favre, supra note 7, at 94.
170. Barbara Newell, Animal Custody Disputes: A Growing Crack in the “Legal Thinghood” of
Nonhuman Animals, 6 ANIMAL L. 179, 180 (2000).
171. Sanjiv Bhattacharya, To Love, Honor and Belly-Scratch; Marriages Come and Go. Judging by
the Rising Number of Pet-Custody Disputes, Though, Some Passions Endure, L.A. TIMES MAG., Jan. 9,
2005, at 20 (quoting Bruce Wagman).
172. See id. (discussing attorney Sandra Toye, who has earned “fees in excess of $100,000” doing
pet-custody cases).
173. For example, Barbara Newell cites Raymond v. Lachmann, 695 N.Y.S.2d 308 (N.Y. App. Div.
1999) as an example of a custody case in which the court recognizes a nonhuman as being more than a
chattel. Newell, supra note 170, at 180 n.6. In Raymond, the trial court awarded ownership and
possession of a cat to the plaintiff conditioned on plaintiff’s payment of certain veterinary costs. The
appellate court reversed and awarded ownership and possession to defendant claiming that was “best
for all concerned.” 695 N.Y.S.2d at 309. Although Newell supplies facts about this case from the
unpublished lower court decision, the published opinion, which is very brief, did not discuss the nature
of the dispute over the cat or any competing property interests. But most significantly, the decision did
not affect the cat’s status as property.
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impact on the property status of animals, and it is unclear why anyone believes
that it will have a different effect as the result of custody cases involving
animals.
Finally, many animal advocates maintain that anticruelty statutes and
prosecutions brought under those statutes will improve our treatment of
174
nonhuman animals and help to erode the property status of animals. As I have
argued, anticruelty laws were originally at least in part a response to changing
social attitudes and a recognition that humans had moral and legal obligations
that they owed to nonhumans.175 However, the notion of having direct moral
and legal obligations is inconsistent with the property status of nonhumans, and,
as a result, anticruelty statutes have been largely ineffective in providing
significant protection to nonhumans.176 Many anticruelty laws contain explicit
exemptions for most forms of institutionalized exploitation. In those situations
in which they do apply, courts have interpreted the concept to prohibit only
those activities that are not customary or usual given the particular use.177
Moreover, anticruelty laws are criminal laws and require proof of intent. Intent
is difficult to show as a general matter, and it becomes even more difficult in
anticruelty cases, in which the alleged crime occurs in a societal context in which
the killing of billions of animals is routine. Finally, violation of an anticruelty
statute has generally been a misdemeanor or summary offense and has carried
an insignificant penalty, although in recent years a considerable number of
states have made felonies of at least some violations.178
In any event, state anticruelty laws do not even apply to the overwhelming
number of instances in which we impose suffering or death on nonhumans
either because the laws include explicit exemptions or because courts effectively
read exemptions into them. It is not accurate to say that these laws apply to
“cruel” behavior because much of what is regarded as legal animal use is
“cruel” as that term is normally used in moral discourse. It is not even accurate

174. See Belkin, supra note 159.
175. See FRANCIONE, supra note 2, at 7–9.
176. For a discussion of the inadequacies of anticruelty laws, see FRANCIONE, supra note 1, at 121–
60; FRANCIONE, supra note 2, at 54–73; see also Reppy, supra note 147; Darian M. Ibrahim, The
Anticruelty Statute: A Study in Animal Welfare, 1 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 175 (2006).
177. For a discussion of the difficulties involved in applying anticruelty laws to conduct that
conforms to the customs and norms of various animal uses, see Ibrahim, supra note 176. A review of
the McDonald’s Corp. v. Steel case in Great Britain indicates that when judgments about what
constitutes “cruel” treatment or “necessary” suffering are not connected to what is customary, they
become very arbitrary and idiosyncratic and could never be used in a context involving criminal
liability. See McDonald’s Corp. v. Steel, No. 1990-M-NO. 5724 (Q.B. 1997) (summary of the judgment),
available at http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/judgmentsfiles/j379/mcdonalds_190697.htm. This case,
commonly referred to as “McLibel,” is to date the most lengthy case in the history of the English legal
system. McDonald’s sued two defendants for, inter alia, allegations that McDonald’s was culpably
responsible for farming practices that the defendants characterized as cruel and inhumane. Justice Bell
refused to apply the standard of the industry to determine whether the statements were defamatory and
held that he must judge for himself, based on expert testimony, whether particular farming practices
were cruel. Justice Bell’s ad hoc analysis makes clear that such a standard could never suffice to support
a criminal conviction.
178. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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to say that these laws are limited to situations in which humans inflict suffering
or death on animals merely for “fun” as many forms of animal-based
“entertainment,” such as rodeos, circuses, and pigeon shoots, are legal. Rather,
anticruelty laws apply only to the miniscule portion of animal uses that fall
completely outside the considerably broad scope of permissible institutionalized
animal exploitation. And, given that animals are property, virtually any use that
generates some sort of economic benefit is permissible.
There is, however, an alternative to the dominant paradigm of “animal law,”
and it is the one that guided our work in the Rutgers Animal Rights Clinic179
over the decade of its existence and that we owed in part to wise advice from a
180
mentor, the late civil rights attorney, William M. Kunstler. Kunstler believed
that the primary role of a progressive lawyer was to protect the rights of those
in society who were trying to cause a paradigm shift in thinking. That is, he did
not see the lawyer as the primary engine for social change; rather, it was the
social activist, the person who sought to educate, persuade, and change
fundamental thinking about particular issues. Such activists would invariably be
vulnerable to attack by a political and legal system that was not amenable to the
change, and it was the job of the attorney to use every tool available to her to
protect that activist. Kunstler’s advice fit in with our general view that the first
task of the animal-rights movement was to educate society about why such a
movement was necessary in the first place and to shift the paradigm away from
the commodity status of nonhumans.
As a result, we concentrated our efforts on assisting animal advocates in
their efforts to educate about the need to abolish and not merely to regulate
particular instances of animal exploitation. They included students in high
schools, universities, medical schools, and veterinary schools who did not want
to vivisect or dissect any animals in their courses; those who wanted to engage
in peaceful demonstration to try to educate others about animal rights,
veganism, and abolition; prisoners who wanted vegan food; those who were
trying to develop “no kill” options to the problem of the companion animal
population; those who sought to stop the round-up and removal of wild horses
from federal lands and to prohibit the killing of deer in suburban areas; and
those who wanted to organize lawful boycotts to stop particular forms of animal
exploitation.
We advised animal advocates how to design legislation and regulations that
were abolitionist rather than regulationist. We sued to get information about
experiments at federally funded institutions, not because we wanted to achieve

179. I began to teach animal rights and the law in 1985 as part of my jurisprudence course at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School. In 1989, I moved to Rutgers University School of Law—
Newark and, with Anna E. Charlton, started the Rutgers Animal Rights Law Clinic in 1990. Students
enrolled in the Clinic received six academic credits per semester for working with us on actual animalrights cases while also learning animal-rights theory in a weekly seminar. We closed the Clinic in 2000,
but we continue to teach regular courses on animal rights and the law.
180. Kunstler wrote the Foreword to Animals, Property, and the Law. See FRANCIONE, supra note
1, at ix–xii.
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better regulation of vivisection, but because we wanted to help to provide the
information that advocates could use to build a consensus against vivisection
and to make clear that the public was watching what went on behind the
laboratory doors. When we represented the owners of Taro, a dog that was
scheduled to be killed under New Jersey’s “dangerous dog” law, we used the
opportunity to focus attention on the irony of the worldwide response to Taro’s
plight at the same time that most of us were eating animals who were in no
morally relevant way different from Taro. And, most importantly, we spent a
good deal of our time trying to empower animal advocates by teaching them
about how they could use the law to become more effective educators about the
need for abolition. Not a single pet trust was ever drafted in our offices. But
that may have been because no client was ever charged for our services, and
because we were free of business considerations.
Modern animal law as it has developed in the past decade or so is not
focused on the efforts of the animal advocate to effect fundamental changes in
the political and social system; it is more focused on the lawyer as the primary
force for social change within the existing legal system. The past 200 years of
animal welfare are compelling proof that this latter approach will not advance
things further in the next decade than it has in the past one.
VI
SIMILAR-MINDS THEORY
Rain Without Thunder expressed concern that the animal-rights movement
was moving toward welfarism and away from rights. In the past decade, the
animal-advocacy movement in the United States has, for the most part, gone
further in the welfarist direction than even I had contemplated when I wrote
that book. The one area in which animal advocates still talk about rights is in
the context of great apes and other animals, such as dolphins, who are thought
181
to have human-like intelligence. According to this view, if animals are
cognitively like us—if they have similar minds—then we must rethink the
human–nonhuman relationship and, perhaps, even grant certain rights to those
animals.
182
What I have called “similar-minds theory” became popular among animal
advocates as the result of The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond Humanity in
183
1993. Although I certainly support prohibiting any exploitation of the great
apes, dolphins, and any other nonhuman, the similar-minds theory reinforces
the very paradigm that has resulted in excluding nonhumans from the moral

181. See, e.g., The Evolving Legal Status of Chimpanzees, 9 ANIMAL L. 1 (2003) (remarks at a
symposium linking moral status with humanlike cognitive characteristics).
182. See Gary L. Francione, Our Hypocrisy, NEW SCIENTIST, June 4-10, 2005, at 51; see also Gary L.
Francione, Taking Sentience Seriously, 1 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 1 (2006).
183. THE GREAT APE PROJECT: EQUALITY BEYOND HUMANITY (Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer
eds., 1993).
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community.184 We have historically justified our exploitation of nonhumans on
the ground that there is a qualitative distinction between humans and other
animals. The latter may be sentient, but they are not intelligent, or rational, or
emotional, or self-conscious. The similar-minds approach claims that, as an
empirical matter, we may have been wrong in the past and at least some
nonhumans may have some of these cognitive characteristics. But this approach
does not question the underlying—and fundamental—moral question: Why is
185
anything more than sentience necessary?
The similar-minds approach
threatens to perpetuate a speciesist hierarchy in which we treat some animals as
“special” and continue to exploit the rest. There are at least two reasons to
186
reject the similar-minds theory.
First, the similar-minds theory is a prescription to engage in more research,
which will ironically involve a good deal of vivisection, so that we can determine
how much like humans nonhumans really are. And at the end of the day, no
matter how similar human minds are to those of nonhumans, there will always
be differences that will allow us to justify exploitation if personhood is based on
possession of these cognitive characteristics. After all, we have known about the
cognitive and genetic similarities between human and nonhuman great apes for
a long while, yet we continue to use the latter in biomedical experiments and to
imprison them in zoos.
Second, the similar-minds theory is arbitrary. We identify some
characteristic, such as humanlike self-awareness or rationality, and we maintain
that any nonhuman without the characteristic is not a member of the moral
community. There is, however, no reason to conclude that being able to do
calculus is better than being able to fly with only your wings, or to breathe
underwater with only your gills. These characteristics may be relevant for some
purposes, but they are not relevant to whether we make a being suffer or kill
that being.
This notion is clear where humans are involved. Consider two humans, one
of whom is a gifted mathematician and one who is severely mentally disabled.
Their relative cognitive capacities may be relevant for purposes of determining

184. I was a contributor to The Great Ape Project and was one of the original signers of A
Declaration on Great Apes. See Gary L. Francione, Personhood, Property and Legal Competence, in id.
at 248. In my chapter in The Great Ape Project, I argued that sentience was the only characteristic
necessary for full membership in the moral community. See id. at 253. Nevertheless, I regard The Great
Ape Project as ill-conceived and I regret my participation.
185. Although Professor Taimie Bryant rejects the similar-minds approach and does not believe that
particular humanlike cognitive characteristics are necessary for moral status or legal protection, she
also argues that arguments based on sentience alone are similarly misguided. See generally Taimie L.
Bryant, Similarity or Difference as a Basis for Justice: Must Animals Be Like Humans to Be Legally
Protected from Humans?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 207 (Winter 2007). I disagree in part with
Bryant’s analysis because I do not accept that a being that is not sentient can have interests.
186. For a further discussion of the difficulties involved in relying on similarities beyond sentience
between humans and nonhumans to justify the moral significance of nonhumans, see FRANCIONE,
supra note 2, at 116–27. For an excellent general discussion of the moral status of nonhumans, including
the significance of their cognitive characteristics, see GARY STEINER, ANTHROPOCENTRISM AND ITS
DISCONTENTS: THE MORAL STATUS OF ANIMALS IN THE HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY (2005).
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how to allocate a particular resource, such as a university scholarship. But for
the purposes of determining whether it is permissible to subject either or both
to painful experiments or to kill them to harvest their organs for the benefit of
others, nearly all of us would regard these two humans as similarly situated and
as having an equal interest in not being treated as a resource for others. Indeed,
we may regard our moral obligation to the disabled human as even greater
precisely because of her vulnerability.
VII
CONCLUSION
The property status of nonhumans remains a substantial impediment to the
meaningful protection of nonhuman interests. Although animal advocates claim
that traditional welfarist strategies can protect animal interests without any
significant modification of the property status of nonhumans, or that welfarist
strategies will lead to modification of the property status of nonhumans, the
past dozen years offers no proof of either of these claims. There have been no
notable improvements in animal welfare and most changes that have occurred
have been linked explicitly to making animal exploitation more beneficial for
humans. Making exploitation more efficient may reduce suffering in minimal
ways, but it is clear that the welfarist approach is rooted in the property
paradigm and perpetuates the view that nonhumans are commodities with only
extrinsic value.
Moreover, animal advocates have lost ground in a number of areas.
Discourse about animal welfare as connected to economic efficiency is no less
prevalent than it was a decade ago and, indeed, is arguably more prevalent. The
animal movement has drifted in a more traditional welfarist direction in that
most of the animal organizations have openly embraced a program of efficient
exploitation. PETA and Peter Singer praise McDonald’s, Wendy’s, and Burger
King for adopting slaughter standards that keep the meat industry operating
187
“safely, efficiently and profitably.” HSUS and Farm Sanctuary campaign
against gestation crates, arguing that alternative production systems will reduce
188
production costs, increase productivity, and increase demand for pork. HSUS
urges that gassing poultry is preferable to electrical stunning because it will
mean less carcass damage, better meat quality, and reduced labor costs.189

187. Supra note 18; see also supra notes 11–25 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 56 and 65 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 107.
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Humane Farm Animal Care,190 with its partners HSUS, American Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Animal People, World Society for the
191
Protection of Animals, and others, promotes the “Certified Humane Raised &
Handled Label,” which it describes as “a consumer certification and labeling
program” to give consumers assurance that a labeled “egg, dairy, meat or
poultry product has been produced with the welfare of the farm animal in
mind.”192 Humane Farm Animal Care emphasizes that “[i]n ‘food animals, stress
193
can affect meat quality . . . and general [animal] health,’” and that the label
“creates a win-win-win situation for retailers and restaurants, producers, and
consumers. For farmers, the win means they can achieve differentiation,
increase market share and increase profitability for choosing more sustainable
practices.”194 These approaches merely reinforce the notion that animals are
commodities and that animal interests should be protected if and only if there is
an economic benefit for humans in doing so. Linking animal welfare with
efficient exploitation is inconsistent with the recognition of the inherent value
of nonhumans. Moreover, the animal movement has explicitly embraced the
notion that being a “conscientious omnivore” is a morally acceptable solution to
the problem of animal exploitation.195
The emerging field of “animal law” has collapsed into nothing more than an
attempt to apply traditional property doctrines to nonhumans. There is no
attempt to challenge the property paradigm through laws or regulations that
recognize that animals have fundamental interests that cannot be disregarded
irrespective of human benefit.
A movement’s ends should define its means. If the goal is abolition, animal
welfare is a means not fitted to that goal either as a matter of moral theory or of
practical strategy. As a moral matter, animal welfare assumes and reinforces the
notion that animals are commodities with only extrinsic or conditional value. As
a practical matter, animal welfare provides almost no benefit to animals and
only makes exploitation more efficient for producers at the same time that it
makes animal users more comfortable about exploiting nonhumans.
The choice is not between doing nothing or pursuing traditional welfare.
The choice is between reinforcing the property paradigm or challenging it. We
can pursue the incremental eradication of the property status—and we can do

190. The Executive Director of Humane Farm Animal Care, Adele Douglass, “serves as an invited
participant on numerous industry animal welfare committees including for the Food Marketing
Institute, National Council of Chain Restaurants, and Burger King,” and in 2003, “was a keynote
speaker at the Animal Welfare Conference of the American Meat Institute.” Humane Farm Animal
Care, The Staff, http://www.certifiedhumane.com/people.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2007). Temple
Grandin is a member of the Scientific Committee of Humane Farm Animal Care. Id.
191. The partners of Humane Farm Animal Care are listed on the homepage of the organization’s
website. See Human Farm Animal Care, http://www.certifiedhumane.com/default.html (see pull-down
menu “Other Organizations”) (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
192. Id. at http://www.certifiedhumane.com/whatis.html.
193. Id. (quoting unspecified article in Agricultural Research).
194. Id. at http://www.certifiedhumane.com/whyproduce.html.
195. See supra notes 137–41 and accompanying text.
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so now—in a variety of ways starting with our own veganism and with our
educational efforts directed toward building an abolitionist movement with
veganism as its moral baseline. To the extent that we choose to pursue laws,
administrative regulations, or litigation, those efforts should be consistent with
the abolitionist goal of the progressive recognition of the inherent value of
nonhumans.
Property status and the animal-welfare laws based upon it “benefit”
196
nonhumans in the same way that property status and slave-welfare laws
“benefited” human slaves. Any use of “benefit” in either context is perverse.
There is, of course, at least one very significant difference between the abolition
of human slavery and the abolition of the property status of nonhumans. Our
accepting that we have no moral justification to continue to treat nonhumans as
commodities would not entail letting domesticated nonhumans run free in the
streets. It would, however, entail that we stop bringing animals into existence
for the purpose of human exploitation.197 We should care for those who are here
now, but we should stop causing more to come into existence. We would still
have to work through what equal consideration would mean in our dealings
with non-domesticated animals. But even that would be much easier to do if we
accepted that the property status of nonhumans has no justification other than
as a result of a speciesist hierarchy that we created and that we perpetuate.

196. This position is presented by a number of welfare advocates. See supra note 114 and
accompanying text.
197. For a further discussion of the consequences of accepting that nonhumans have a right not to
be treated as property, see FRANCIONE, supra note 2, at 153–60.

